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Challenging Wolf Packs: Thoughts on Efficient Enforcement of 
Shareholder Transparency Rules 
Dirk Zetzsche1 
[Draft as of 3 February 2010] 
Abstract: The key issue concerning shareholder transparency rules, and 
the related rules on acting in concert (Europe), or the voting group concept 
(U.S.) is enforcement. Rather than thinking about appropriate enforcement 
measures, jurisdictions such as the UK and Switzerland decided in favor 
of Economic Ownership Disclosure. The current debate in the U.S., on the 
European and national level of some European jurisdictions is moving in 
the same direction. This article examines a different option which is the 
better enforcement of existing transparency rules. In order to counter 
secret acquisition strategies, similar to antitrust leniency and “protected 
disclosure” (i.e. whistle blowing) rules, governments are best advised to 
assign a reward for disclosure.  
Under the reward model presented here, the initial stock price reaction 
reflects the value of the information previously hidden from the market. 
The first participant of a scheme who discloses the holdings of all scheme 
participants is to be assigned the difference between the price of the 
target’s voting shares ex ante and ex post disclosure, calculated on the 
basis of the participants’ joint holdings of shares (Announcement 
Premium). Distinguishing between schemes based on the equity value of 
the parties involved (Equity Strategy) – commonly referred to as wolf 
packs - and schemes where an acquirer seeks to create a large stake 
based on derivatives (Service Strategy), assigning the Announcement 
Premium to the first entity disclosing the scheme’s holding and intentions 
is likely to counter Equity Strategies efficiently. The Service Strategy is 
countered effectively by granting the Announcement Premium to agents 
that act on behalf of the intermediaries (i.e. to bank employees).  
Keywords: Shareholder activism, hedge funds, private equity funds, 
hidden ownership, empty voting, enforcement, announcement effect, 
Premium Claim, derivatives, contracts of differences, equity swaps, 
cartels, leniency, antitrust, takeovers, whistle blowing, protected 
disclosure, mandatory bid, change of control, wolf pack.  
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[C]ovenants, without the sword, are but words  
and of no strength to secure a man at all 
(Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Pt 2, Chap XVII “Of the causes, generation, and 
definition of a commonwealth”, ¶ 2, p. 85; reprint by OUP: Oxford World Classic, p. 111) 
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A. Introduction 
The efficacy of mandatory disclosure of shareholder transparency rules is 
at the forefront of the current policy agenda and receives significant 
attention in academia. Across the globe, much effort is devoted to 
designing wide-ranging disclosure rules. This article takes a different 
stance by promoting the idea that current rules suffer from weak 
enforcement2 which is facilitated by market surveillance problems3 rather 
than poor legal design. Since deterrence is a combination of the penalty 
and the probability of being caught,4 this article seeks to add insights as to 
how Government’s decision in favor of mandatory disclosure of major 
                                                 
2
 Reinhard H. Schmidt, Gerald Spindler, FINANZINVESTOREN AUS ÖKONOMISCHER 
UND JURISTISCHER PERSPEKTIVE (transl. Financial investors from an economic and 
legal perspective), Nomos: 2008, at p. 250 ¶198, arguing that proving acting in concert is 
“incredibly difficult.“; Michael Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure in 
Europe - Empty Voting, Hidden Ownership and the Transparency Directive, Stanford 
Journal of Business, Law & Finance (2009) - draft on SSRN, at 34, 37 et seq. 
(highlighting the issues surrounding the application of existing rules); Dirk A. Zetzsche, 
Hidden Ownership in Europe: BAFin’s Decision in Schaeffler v. Continental (2009) 10:1 
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 115. 
3
 Central Counterparty (CCP) Clearing for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives may reduce 
the market surveillance problems. A CCP interposes itself between the buyer and the 
seller of a derivative security. When trading through a CCP, the single contract between 
two initial OTC counterparties is replaced by two new contracts – between the CCP and 
each buyer and seller of the OTC contract. This structure improves the management of 
counterparty risk. Moreover, it allows the CCP to perform multilateral netting of exposures 
and payments. Finally, it increases transparency by gathering information on market 
activity and exposures in the hands of the CCP, which may be made available to 
regulators and the public. See C Ledrut, C Upper, Changing post-trading arrangements 
for OTC Derivatives”, (2007) Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Quarterly Review, 
12/07, pp 83–95; Stephen G Cecchetti / Jacob Gyntelberg / Marc Hollanders, Central 
counterparties for over-the-counter derivatives, (2009) BIS Quarterly Review, 9/09, at 45. 
Some later activities towards CCP clearing for derivatives include the initiative by U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, “Regulatory Reform Over-The-Counter 
(OTC) Derivatives” (13 May 2009, tg-129), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg129.htm (February 2010), requiring clearing of 
all standardized OTC derivatives through regulated CCPs, and the Consultation by the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), Trade Repositories in the 
European Union, CESR/09-837 (September 2009). 
4
 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment, (1968) 76:2 Journal of Political Economy 169. 
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shareholdings can be enforced most efficiently in the case of certain 
hidden acquisition strategies. Looking - in Garrett Hardin’s terms - for a 
“technical solution”5 to the compliance problem, it develops and analyzes a 
reward model of shareholder transparency rules based on antitrust 
leniency, traditional whistle blowing and crown witness schemes.  
While major acquisitions by one party may be appropriately detected and 
sanctioned by enforcement agencies, given the documentation associated 
with it on the side of investment banks, regulators face insurmountable 
difficulties when enforcing transparency rules in the case of certain hidden 
acquisition strategies. This article identifies two of these different 
strategies subject to enforcement issues. The first strategy hereafter 
referred to as Equity Strategy is an equity-based technique, commonly 
referred to as ‘wolf pack strategy’: the acquirer teams up with other 
acquirers. Each of the participants purchases a share of the target’s equity 
which is close to, yet below, the disclosure threshold for shareholdings. In 
most cases, regulators cannot prove the team effort since the coordination 
is based on oral agreements. The second technique hereafter referred to 
as Service Strategy is based on service contracts with a multitude of 
investment banks. The acquirer enters into derivative contracts according 
to which the investment bank acquires a significant share in the target, but 
the economic exposure of these shares is vested in the acquirer. The 
rights stemming from these shares, if not in its favor, will not be used 
against the acquirer. At a point in time prior to, or following the takeover 
bid, the shares will be transferred to the acquirer. While the contracts 
reveal the economic characteristics of the derivative, the documentation 
typically lacks any side agreement relating to how the investment bank is 
expected to vote, as well as how and when the shares will be transferred 
to the acquirer. Consequently, a lot of speculation surrounding the true 
content of the respective agreements is characteristic of the Equity and 
the Service Strategy. 
While in many ways incomplete, regulators have made both of the above 
techniques subject to disclosure rules. Under US laws, the above 
                                                 
5
 Garett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, (1968) 162 Science 1243.  
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schemes may account for deemed beneficial ownership under the rules 
promulgated under Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (Rule 13d-3(a) and (b)).6 In Europe, for purposes of the shareholder 
transparency rules of Artt. 9 et seq. of the EC Transparency Directive, and 
for the threshold prompting a mandatory bid under Art. 5 of the EC 
Takeover Directive, shares held for the equity-based strategy may meet 
the ‚acting in concert’ test under the laws of EC Member States. The 
service-based strategies may meet the requirements of an ‘implicit 
agreement’ under Art. 13 of the EC Transparency Directive according to 
which the acquirer may mandate delivery of the shares held by the 
investment banks, or may be qualified as shares ‘held on behalf of’ the 
target under Art. 10g) of the EC Transparency Directive.7  
Some regulators have reduced, or intend to reduce, the uncertainty 
surrounding broad-phrased disclosure rules. They did so by requiring 
mandatory disclosure not only of shareholdings carrying voting rights, but 
also of economic positions that do not carry voting rights (hereafter 
‘Economic Ownership Disclosure’).8 Economic Ownership Disclosure, 
however, has other downsides: Any strengthening of shareholder 
disclosure rules is likely to reduce investment in information about the true 
                                                 
6
 17 II Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 240.13d-3. 
7
 For details, see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Hidden Ownership in Europe: BAFin’s Decision in 
Schaeffler v. Continental, (2009) 10:1 EBOR 115, at 132. 
8
 For the UK see Financial Services Agency, DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
RULES (DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCES) INSTRUMENT 2009, 
prepared by Policy Statement PS 09/3 - Feedback on CP08/17 and final rules (March 
2009); Disclosure of Contracts for Differences – Feedback and Policy Statement on 
CP07/20, CP08/17 (October 2008); Policy Update on Disclosure of Contracts for 
Difference (July 2008), and Disclosure of Contracts for Difference, Consultation Paper 
07/20 (November 2007), all available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk. The rules requiring 
disclosure of certain positions from Contracts for Difference (CfDs) came into force on 1 
June 2009. For Switzerland see Art. 20(2bis) BEHG of the Swiss law on Stock 
Exchanges and Securities Trading (BEHG) and Artt. 11, 13(1) of the Ordinance of the 
Swiss Banking Commission on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading (BEHV-EBK); 
C.H. Von der Crone, E. Bilek and M. Hirschle, ‘Neuerungen im Offenlegungsrecht’ (New 
Developments regarding Disclosure Rules), 80 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht (SZW) (2008) pp. 1 and 4; U. Bertschinger, ‘Finanzinstrumente in der 
Aktienrechtsrevision – Derivate, Securities Lending und Repurchase Agreements’ 
(Financial Instruments and the Reform of Corporate Law – Derivatives, Securities 
Lendung and Repurchase Agreements), SZW 80 (2008) pp. 208 et seq.; P. Nobel, 
‘Neues Aktienrecht’ (The New Corporate Law), 80 SZW (2008) pp. 175 and 188 et seq. In 
addition, the European Parliament commissioned a study on the issues of hidden 
ownership and empty voting which has been submitted at the end of October 2009. 
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value of an issuer:9 Disclosure of a major shareholding signals under-
pricing of the said shares at the stock markets. Shareholders that do not 
invest in information may freeride on the signal provided by said 
disclosure. In turn, the stock price increases which renders the takeover 
more costly. In addition, management may launch defensive measures 
early on, or even prior to the takeover bid which render the takeover post 
disclosure even more expensive as compared to defensive measures 
being launched after a significant or even a controlling stake is acquired. 
Consequently, if disclosure rules are too stringent, fewer buying 
opportunities are identified and fewer takeover offers are being launched. 
Mitigating takeover activity, in turn, reduces the disciplining effect of 
takeovers on management, in general. As life gets easier for 
management, agency costs are likely to increase,10 which is detrimental to 
(at least) the interests of dispersed stockholders. This is particularly true 
as potential acquirers are not tied to the public stock markets. As a 
response to Economic Ownership Disclosure, potential acquirers may 
make profitable acquisitions in the private equity or commodity domain. 
The departure of these investors may also reduce liquidity of the stock 
markets. Reduced liquidity is likely to have a negative impact on both the 
price discovery function and price sensitivity of the stock markets. In short: 
If disclosure is too strict, the marginal benefits of disclosure are negative. 
This article examines a different option by developing a model that 
induces participants to reveal the content of the respective agreements 
                                                 
9
 S. Grossman & J. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 
Amer. Econ. Rev. 393, 405 (1980). 
10
 Other arguments against broad-phrased disclosure rules include potential law suits and 
discouragement of overall monitoring: European Commission, Report on More Stringent 
National Measures Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of 
Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers whose Securities 
are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, SEC (2008) 3033 final (2008), at 10; H. 
Fleischer and K. Schmolke, ‘Kapitalmarktrechtliche Beteiligungstransparenz nach 21 ff. 
WpHG und "Hidden Ownership“’ (Securities law-based Transparency of Shareholdings 
under ss. 21 et seq. WpHG and Hidden Ownership) 29 (33) Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) (2008) p. 1501 et seq.; Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey M. Netter, 
Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 131, 144 (1987); Bernhard 
Black, Next Steps in Corporate Governance Reform: 13D Reuls and Control Person 
Liability, in: K. Lehn & R. Kamphuis eds., MODERNIZING US SECURITIES 
REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1992), at 201 (raising 
concerns that institutional investors may be discouraged from monitoring). 
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entered into in the vicinity of an acquisition of a large shareholding, or a 
takeover bid, respectively. 
Part B analyzes the two main strategies to prepare for acquisitions 
secretly, which is referred to herein as Equity and Service Strategy. It 
shows that disclosure of major shareholdings runs counter to the scheme 
participants’ incentives. Upon disclosure, the target’s stock price is 
expected to experience significant abnormal returns. I refer to this effect 
as Announcement Premium. Acquirers who otherwise need to pay a 
higher stock price for further acquisitions avoid paying the Announcement 
Premium to the sellers by maintaining secrecy. The investment banks 
financing the deal have reason to be concerned that the transaction will 
fail if the Announcement Premium is significant and the acquirers’ stake is 
small, due to a higher price for the target’s shares. In addition, investment 
banks can be expected to lose clients in future transactions if they disclose 
the acquisition on their own.  
Part C holds that traditional enforcement of shareholder transparency 
rules is ineffective. Effectiveness of ex ante enforcement11 relies on ex 
post enforcement. The available sanctions either deprive shareholders of 
a bid altogether, or of the market test that a lawfully disclosed acquisition 
would provide. Most importantly, traditional enforcement does not 
overcome issues associated with the burden of proof. Since 
documentation is scarce, regulators are limited to speculation which rarely 
withstands a critical review in court. 
Part D presents a reward model for the enforcement of shareholder 
transparency rules. The remainder of the article adjusts the model 
assumptions to reflect real world conditions. 
Due to inefficient enforcement, refraining from disclosure results in a 
collusive equilibrium. An efficient regime is to increase the costs for 
participants’ remaining silent to a level where it exceeds the costs of early 
disclosure. At the same time, the participants have the best knowledge 
about the scheme, they may disclose at the cheapest costs of all market 
                                                 
11
 Ex ante enforcement as used herein refers to all measures that seek to detect and 
deter future infringements of the law. See infra, C. I.  
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participants. Yet they have the weakest incentives to do so. In that regard, 
the situation is analogous to antitrust cartels. In contrast to cartels, 
however, in the Equity and the Service Strategy participants have no 
incentives to defect. Moreover, the limited period of time for making the 
respective strategy work makes it harder to detect the hidden activities. 
The incentives for going public must be greater, in relative terms, than 
conventional leniency is able to offer. 
In order to overcome the disincentives for disclosure, I propose a reward-
based enforcement model. Pursuant to that model, the Announcement 
Premium from the joint shares of all participants is assigned to the first 
party who discloses the scheme and the related intentions of the 
participants (hereafter referred to as Premium Claim). The larger the share 
collectively held by participants, the greater the incentive for disclosure. 
The Premium Claim creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma among participants 
(albeit that communication among them is possible).  
For the Equity Strategy, my model most likely results in an equilibrium 
under which no participant is willing the scheme’s collective holdings to 
surpass disclosure thresholds for fear of defection by fellow participants 
that seek to cash-in the Premium Claim. The law can render counter-
measures such as requiring security for participation void at low costs. For 
the Service Strategy, due to reputational restraints, the financial 
intermediaries involved come close to game theory’s perennial players. 
Banks defecting by early disclosure is unlikely. Thus, I suggest to assign 
the Premium Claim to the agents (in particular, the employees) of the core 
intermediaries involved in the Service Strategy. My model increases the 
costs of secrecy and the likelihood of disclosure for both the Service and 
the Equity Strategy. 
In order to provide an apt focus, this article willfully disregards a number of 
questions related to mandatory disclosure and takeovers, in general: This 
article does not address the question of whether takeovers are beneficial. 
Takeovers are a legally accepted way in which control in an issuer may 
change hands and advanced jurisdictions provide for a procedural setting 
to that effect. Ethical or economic qualifications of takeovers are beyond 
- 10 - 
the scope of this article. Nor does this article discuss whether disclosure of 
shareholdings, or related conduct, is efficient or desirable. While the 
criticism regarding transparency of major shareholdings does not go 
unnoticed, it is not the aim of this article to reconsider Manne’s arguments 
against mandatory disclosure, in general,12 or other theories holding that 
market prices aptly reflect any – direct or indirect – increase in 
shareholdings by investors, or that disclosure rules on major 
shareholdings (alike other types of inside information13) cannot add any 
further benefit to market efficiency14 and / or investor protection.15 In 
addition, this article does not analyze how stock prices respond to 
disclosure of major shareholdings. While previous research has shown 
significant abnormal (short-term) returns upon first-time disclosure of 
major shareholdings,16 it is not the task of this article to analyze the how 
                                                 
12
 Henry G. Manne, Henry, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, New York: The Free 
Press, 1966. 
13
 In a non-technical meaning, the discussion is about undisclosed inside information. 
See for the trading on negative vs. positive inside information Kristoffel Grechenig, The 
Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law, 
(2006) University of Memphis Law Review 37, 75; an overview of empirical analyses on 
trading patterns on inside information provide M. King & A. Roell, Insider trading, in: 
(1988) Economic Policy 6, 163; Dolgopolov, Insider trading and the bid-ask spread: a 
critical evaluation of adverse selection in the market setting, (2004) Cap. U. L. Rev. 33, 
83. 
14
 For example, this may be due to insiders voluntarily disclosing or forwarding inside 
information, or specialized analysts detecting inside information; for the former see 
Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 
(1986) 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 35, at 43 pp.; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, (1998) 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2373 pp.; for the 
latter Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, (1992) 47 Journal of 
Finance 1661. 
15
 For example, Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure (2009) 109 Colum. 
L. Rev. – forthcoming (on SSRN), at 17. 
16
 Although the premium for passive investors is smaller, this is true for all types of 
investor types: For potential buyers: WH Mikkelson & RS Ruback, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Investment Process, (1985) J. Finan. Econ. 14, 523 
(1985); Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence 
on Six Controversial Investors, (1985) 14 J. Fin. Econ. 555 (1985); Steven R. Bishop, 
Pre-Bid Acquisitions and Substantial Shareholder Notices, (1991) 16 Australian J. 
Manage 1 (1991); for activist investors / hedge funds: Along Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank 
Partnoy, Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, (2008) Journal of Finance 63:4, 1729-75; abnormal returns of 5% - 7% 
within 20 days; April Klein, Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism, London 2007: abnormal 
returns of 10% within 30 days; Mark Mietzner, Denis Schweizer, Hedgefeonds and 
Private Equity: Differences in Value Creation, Oestrich-Winkel (EBS), 2008: abnormal 
returns with 2 times 20 days; Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism 
and Takeovers (2008), at 29, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003792. For 
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and why of this stock price reaction in-depth. Moreover, this article does 
not explore extensively the question of how shareholder transparency 
rules are or should be designed, in order to cover long positions stemming 
from the use of derivatives and other types of indirect shareholdings 
associated with the terms hidden ownership and empty voting17 - a 
question that is widely discussed,18 due to some high profile cases, inter 
alia, in the U.S.19, the UK20 and Germany.21 Finally, this article does not 
                                                                                                                                     
passive investors: Christopher Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as 
Shareholder Activists (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=971018, at 42 
(comparing s. 13D and 13G filings, showing a premium of 1.74% for passive and 3.44% 
for active investors). These studies are confirmed by 2006 announcements surveyed by 
the Financial Services Agency, Disclosure of Contracts for Differences, Consultation and 
Draft Handbook Text (CP 07/20) (2007), annex 3, p. 14. For informed traders who are 
unlikely to pursue activist strategies (such as mutual funds): See Aslihan Bozcuk & M. 
Ameziane Lasfer, The Information Content of Institutional Trades on the London Stock 
Exchange, 40 J. Finan. Quant. Anal. 621, 631 (2005); Bishop, ibid, at 19. 
17
 H.C. Hu and B.S. Black, ‘Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and 
Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’, 13 J. Corp. Fin. 
(2007) p. 343; ‘The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership’, 
79 South. Cal. L. Rev. (2006) p. 811; ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: 
Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms’, 61 Bus. Lawy. (2006) p. 1011; ‘Equity and Debt 
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2008) 
p. 625; ‘Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk 
Implications’, 14 Europ. Fin. Man. (2008) p. 663; ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership’, M&A Lawyer (March 2007) at pp. 9-12; ‘Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An 
Overview’, The M&A Lawyer, Vol. 1 (April 2008) pp. 4-10. 
18
 See, for example, European Parliament, Resolution of 23 September 2008 with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Transparency of Institutional Investors, 
European Parliament (2007/2239(Ini)) (2008); Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without 
Responsibility or Risk - How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic 
and Voting Rights?, (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review – forthcoming; Michael Schouten, 
The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure in Europe - Empty Voting, Hidden 
Ownership and the Transparency Directive, Stanford Journal of Business, Law & Finance 
– forthcoming. 
19
 See U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 11 June 2008, Case 1:08-
cv-02764-LAK - CSX v. The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI) -, confirmed by summary 
order No. 08-2899-cv (2nd Cir. Sept. 15, 2008). See also J. Coffee, ‘Regulators Need to 
Shine a Light on Derivatives’, Financial Times (30 June 2008) p. 13. The question of civil 
damages for “short-swing” profits under s. 16(b) of the SEA was settled for $ 11 Mio while 
CSX had identified potential recoverable damages of approx. § 138 Mio, see Theodore 
Mirvis, Hedge Funds Settle “Short Swing” Profits Litigation, Harvard Law School 
Corporate Governance Blog, 28 December 2008.  
20
 See Tom Siebens & Melissa Gambol, “Who’s hiding behind the hedges? 
Developments in the USA and UK may limit use of total return swaps to conceal equity 
stakes in public companies, (2009) Capital Markets Law Journal 4:2, 172-178. 
21
 For the Schaeffler – Continental Case (Germany) Dirk A. Zetzsche, Hidden Ownership 
in Europe: BAFin’s Decision in Schaeffler v. Continental (2009) 10:1 European Business 
Organization Law Review (EBOR) 115. A legislative proposal is presented by Theodor 
Baums & Maike Sauter, Anschleichen an Übernahmeziele mittels Cash Settled Equity 
Derivaten – ein Regelungsvorschlag, ILF_WP_097 (2/ 2009), online http://www.ilf-
frankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_097.pdf (last visited Nov 2009). For an overview of 
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make any suggestions as to which stock price is fair in the takeover 
context. While there may be a significant level of (noisy) trading in the 
vicinity of takeovers assuming the acquirer’s willingness to raise the price 
of the first bid, it is not the task of this article to question the legal 
assumption that transparency of major shareholdings supports fair market 
prices.22 
B. The Dilemma – Adverse Incentives in a 
Multiparty Environment 
This article seeks to add insights as to how we can improve compliance 
with existing shareholder transparency rules. Shareholder transparency 
rules mandate acquirers to disclose if their (joint) share surpasses certain 
thresholds provided by securities law.23 Circumventing these disclosure 
rules enables shareholders to secretly build up a significant stake in an 
issuer whose shares are traded at regulated markets. For this purpose, 
acquirers employ - separately, or jointly, as the case may be -24 two types 
of strategies: the Equity Strategy (infra B.I.), or the Service Strategy (infra 
B.II.).  
I. The Equity Strategy: Wolf Packs 
The first strategy is an equity-based technique.  
                                                                                                                                     
the legislative developments see Michael Schouten & Mathias M. Siems, The Evolution of 
Ownership Disclosure Rules across Countries (on SSRN). 
22
 Recital (1) of the Directive 2004/109/EC, OJ L 390/38 (2004) (‘Transparency Directive’) 
states: “The disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about security 
issuers builds sustained investor confidence and allows an informed assessment of their 
business performance and assets. This enhances both investor protection and market 
efficiency.” Recital (2) refers specifically to disclosure of major shareholdings. To what 
extent the rules fulfill this assumption, is subject to debate among experts. See, for 
example, Eilìs Ferran, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET (Cambridge University 
Press: 2004), at 127 pp.; Michael Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership 
Disclosure in Europe - Empty Voting, Hidden Ownership and the Transparency Directive, 
Stanford Journal of Business, Law & Finance (forthcoming) - draft on SSRN, at 5. 
23
 US securities law requires disclosure of beneficial ownership of at least 5% of the 
issuer’s voting rights; Under the European Transparency Directive, Participant States 
may set thresholds not exceeding 5% of the voting rights. Some states such as Italia 
require disclosure starting at 1% of the voting rights.   
24
 In CSX ./. TCI (supra n. 19), TCI held a large stake of up to 14% indirectly based on the 
Service Strategy, while TCI was acting in concert with another hedge fund (G3) that held 
approx. 5% of CSX shares. 
- 13 - 
1. Key Driver: Equity Value 
The key feature of the Equity Strategy is that each participation is driven 
by an expected increase in the value of a participant’s stake in the issuer. 
This increase may be the result of either the announcement effect,25 or a 
potential restructuring of the firm pursued by existing management under 
the pressure exerted by the acquirer,26 or by new management following a 
takeover of the firm.27  
If an acquirer seeks to take over the company, it may accrue additional 
benefits by remaining silent and disregarding disclosure rules: Under the 
European mandatory bid-rule of Article 5 of the Takeover Directive28 upon 
assembling a stake that carries control (which is, in most cases, defined 
as the acquisition of 30% or one-third of the issuer’s voting rights),29 
participants are required to issue a mandatory bid for all outstanding 
shares at a price that relates to the weighted average stock price for a 
certain period of time prior to the bid, and that is at least as high as the 
highest price previously paid to another seller (at the stock exchange or 
beyond).30 Given that the share price increases upon announcement of 
                                                 
25
 See references supra n. 16. 
26
 This was the likely driver of TCI’s strategy in CSX ./. TCI (supra n. 19). 
27
 Please note that takeovers do not constitute the usual behavior of hedge funds.  
28
 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on takeover bids; OJ L 142/12-23 (30 April 2004). 
29
 See Article 5 (3) of Directive 2004/25/EC, supra n. 28: “The percentage of voting rights 
which confers control for the purposes of paragraph 1 and the method of its calculation 
shall be determined by the rules of the Participant State in which the company has its 
registered office.” For details across Participant States see European Commission, 
Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268, at 
Annex 2 (acquisition of 30% of voting rights required by Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK; one-third of the 
voting rights require Portugal, Slovakia, Luxembourg and France). 
30
 See Article 5 (4) of Directive 2004/25/EC, supra n. 28: “The highest price paid for the 
same securities by the offeror, or by persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period, 
to be determined by Participant States, of not less than six months and not more than 12 
before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall be regarded as the equitable price. If, after 
the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or 
any person acting in concert with him/her purchases securities at a price higher than the 
offer price, the offeror shall increase his/her offer so that it is not less than the highest 
price paid for the securities so acquired. Provided that the general principles laid down in 
Article 3(1) are respected, Participant States may authorise their supervisory authorities 
to adjust the price referred to in the first subparagraph in circumstances and in 
accordance with criteria that are clearly determined. To that end, they may draw up a list 
of circumstances in which the highest price may be adjusted either upwards or 
the major shareholding, creating a large stake prior to disclosure reduces 
the minimum price for the mandatory bid. In the U.S., where acquisition of 
control does not prompt a mandatory bid, but management may engage in 
takeover defenses, the same is true if the secretly assembled stake grants 
control over the company. Given that control has changed hands and that 
enforcement is inefficient, management’s defen
useless. Management can be expected to step aside with no further 
opposition.  
2. Co-ordinated Efforts
In order to secure the above benefits, t
acquirers. Each of the 
which is close to, yet below, the disclosure threshold for 
shareholdings. 
Fig 1: The Equity Strategy
This article is not about drafting new rules but enforcing existing ones; it 
does not take a stand in the discussio
harmful effects regarding mandatory disclosure of acting in concert, or 
                                        
downwards, for example where the highest price was set by agreement between the 
purchaser and a seller, where the market prices of the securities in ques
manipulated, where market prices in general or certain market prices in particular have 
been affected by exceptional occurrences, or in order to enable a firm in difficulty to be 
rescued. They may also determine the criteria to be applied in
the average market value over a particular period, the break
other objective valuation criteria generally used in financial analysis.”
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voting groups. While not all jurisdictions subject all forms of cooperation to 
mandatory disclosure,31 the conduct hereafter referred to as Equity 
Strategy describes a situation in which the cooperation among acquirers of 
shares must be disclosed under the respective national laws if it is to meet 
the disclosure threshold while each participant’s stake stays below the 
disclosure threshold. 
II. The Service Strategy  
1. Co-ordination by Derivatives 
Under the Service Strategy the acquirer / originator of the scheme enters 
into derivative contracts with investment banks which lead, perfect 
information given, to a legal situation in which the share hedges held by 
the investment banks count as shares held by the acquirer for the 
purposes of disclosure rules. Again, while the total accumulated stakes 
held by different investment banks exceed the disclosure threshold, each 
bank’s stake stays below the disclosure threshold.  
For example, the Service Strategy may be employed by entering into 
Contracts for Difference / Cash-settled Total Return Equity Swaps with the 
acquirer taking the long leg and investment banks the short leg of the 
swap.32 Under such a swap agreement, two cash flows stemming from 
reference values are exchanged, or ‘swapped’. The swap of cash flows is 
taking place at some point in the future and, as such, the future value of at 
least one of the underlying assets will be unknown at the time each leg of 
the swap is established. Typically, one reference value is that of a virtual 
bond whose yield refers to state bank lending terms – at the Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) or the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) + x% – while the other reference value is cash flow from a quoted 
                                                 
31
 See for the U.S. *; for Europe European Commission, Report on More Stringent 
National Measures Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of 
Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers whose Securities 
are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, SEC (2008) 3033 final (2008), at 10; 
CESR, Summary of responses to Questionnaire on Transposition of the Transparency 
Directive,CESR/08-514b (2008). 
32
 For a primer on swaps see Stuart Greenbaum & Anjan Thakor, Contemporary 
Financial Intermediation, 2nd Ed. (AP, 2007), at 323 et seq. As a result of industry 
coordination through organizations such as the ISDA, total resturn equity swaps have 
been highly standardized. 
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stock (e.g. the target’s shares) reflected in its stock price and dividends 
respectively. One swap party – the ‘Short Party’ – pays out the difference 
between the cash flows to the other swap party – the ‘Long Party’ – when 
the stock price increases, while the Long Party makes good to the short 
party any loss in value when the stock price decreases. Normally, 
investment banks function as professional swap counterparties. The banks 
are not interested in bearing the risk stemming from the derivative 
contract. In order to even out its risk, the Short Party may enter into 
derivative contracts with other banks, or purchase the underlying shares. 
In addition to the Long Party’s obligations stemming from the swap itself, 
an investment bank receives interest on the capital invested for its hedges, 
and swap fees for running the swap (infra Figure 2).  
 
Fig 2: Contracts for Differences (‘CFD’) / Cash-settled Total Return Equity Swap: 
 
In ordinary swap agreements a Short Party to a swap does not need to 
hold the shares (although it may want to for hedging purposes). It is within 
the context of the Service Strategiy that the Short Party will invariably hold 
the shares, while the Long Party bears the economic risk. The Short Party 
is generally deemed shareholder under the respective disclosure rules. 
Traditional U.S. and European disclosure rules do not cover the Long 
• Fees 
• Interest on virtual bond at 
EURIBOR / LIBOR 
• Balancing stock price 
decrease Short Party 
(investment bank) 
Target company 
(issuer) 
• Balancing stock 
price increase 
• Dividends 
Long Party 
(investor) 
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Party’s sole economic exposure;33 instead, they require some additional 
influence over the voting power of the underlying shares.34 While the legal 
qualification may vary, the same economic characteristic may be achieved 
with any type of derivative contract, in particular with put and call options.  
If the acquirer seeks to avoid disclosure rules, it may create a derivative 
scheme (infra Figure 3) for a significant part of the target’s shares with one 
investment bank (hereafter referred to as Core Intermediary). The Core 
Intermediary holds a stake below the disclosure threshold itself, and is 
hedged by derivative contracts with other investment banks (Int 1; Int N), 
which in turn hold stakes below the disclosure threshold. The acquirer’s 
joint economic stake comprises its own direct shares plus the shares held 
indirectly via the core intermediary (the “Total Return Equity”, denoted as 
X). By virtue of oral, ‘gentlemen’s agreements, the acquirer may influence 
how the banks vote.  
  
                                                 
33
 For the Economic Ownership Disclosure rules in Switzerland and England see supra n. 
8.  
34
 For the U.S., see Rule 13d-3(a) under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-
3(a): “A beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, 
through any contract, arrangement, understanding relationship, or otherwise has or 
shares: (i) voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such 
security; and/or, (ii) investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct 
the disposition of, such security; the accepted interpretation of Art. 7 sent. 1 No. 1 of the 
(first) Transparency Directive 88/627/EC and Art. 10g of the (second) Transparency 
Directive among German securities lawyers is that a contractual scheme will lead to the 
short counterparty holding shares on the long counterparty’s behalf if the long party (1) 
bears the economic risk of the underlying shares, and (2) is capable of influencing how 
voting rights are exercised, see A. Koppensteiner, Appendix to s. 20 AktG, Commentary 
to ss. 21 et seq. WpHG, in U. Noack and W. Zöllner, eds., Kölner Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz, 3rd edn., at n. 18; U.H. Schneider, Commentary to s. 22 WpHG, in H.D. 
Assmann and U.H. Schneider, eds., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 4th edn. (Cologne, Otto 
Schmidt, 2006) at n. 45; for Portugal see the interpretation of s. 20a of the Portuguese 
Securities Code by the Portuguese securities regulator CMVM in re Portugal Telecom 
and Semapa, see http://web3.cmvm.pt/sdi2004/emitentes/docs/FR3120.pdf.  
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Fig 3: Service Strategy with Cash-settled Total Return Equity Swap / CFD35 
Please note that not all of the investment banks (Int 1; Int N) need to know 
what is happening. However, it is likely that the core intermediary is aware 
of what the acquirers aspire to achieve; this is particularly true if the 
derivative position held by the core intermediary on behalf of the acquirers 
exceeds certain limits.36 While the Long Party could enter into derivative 
contracts with all intermediaries itself, it needs to manage multiple hedging 
relationships and make sure that none of the positions, together with the 
proprietary trading positions, and the positions of other clients of the 
respective intermediaries, exceed the disclosure threshold. Handling this 
requires skill and effort, both of which exist at investment banks. From the 
perspective of the acquirer, there is also the added benefit of anonymity. 
2. Key Drivers  
The acquirer’s incentives are essentially the ones provided by the equity 
scheme (supra B.I.1.); however, the incentives to maintain secrecy are 
                                                 
35
 Based on Schaeffler’s scheme preparing for the takeover of Continental AG. 
36
 It is said to be customary in the City of London that the Long Party explains its motives 
to the Short Party when the long positions exceed a stake of 15% of the issuer’s equity. 
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greater when compared to a straight-forward acquisition based on the fact 
that the originator’s position in the target’s share is leveraged due to the 
derivative contracts.  
In contrast, the core intermediary’s position regarding the target is hedged 
(supra B.II.1.). The core intermediary benefits neither from an increasing, 
nor a decreasing stock price. Being involved in, or running, a derivative 
scheme constitutes a viable business strategy itself. The same is likely to 
be true for the investment banks (Int 1; Int N); these banks seek to sell out 
the risk from the short-leg of the swap to clients that wish to hold a short 
position in said stocks. 
The investment banks’ benefits comprise of four factors: 
(1) The longer the derivative scheme is maintained, the greater is the 
investment bank’s profit: Swap fees are typically a fraction of the swap 
value at the beginning and at the termination of the swap. If the parties 
agree on value-based swap fees, the banks benefit to a small extend from 
the increase in the value of the target’s stock.37 Moreover, creating the 
derivative-based scheme will require time. It is estimated that an acquirer 
can purchase up to a third of the daily trading volume without significantly 
impacting on the market price, and without the markets and the issuer 
noticing. Investment banks will increase the overall positions piece by 
piece. The total swap amount entered into and thus the fees charged to 
the client early in the scheme is small as compared to the fees charged at 
a latter point in time. The more stocks are subject to the swap scheme, the 
greater the investment bank’s profit. Finally, also note that drafting the 
respective derivative contracts is costly; negotiating these contracts for the 
first time induces the largest share of transaction costs. From the bank’s 
perspective derivative schemes exhibit significant economies of scale. 
(2) The same argument applies to the interest that the Long Party pays: in 
the absence of defaults and deteriorating credit risk, the longer the 
                                                 
37
 Whether the swap fees are based on the market value which fluctuates over time or the 
notional amount which is fixed by agreement - in most cases it is the value of the 
underlying assets at the day the swap is executed - is subject to the parties’ discretion. In 
client specific contracts as those provided by ISDA, the swap fees are calculated on the 
basis of the notional amount. In addition to these swap fees, a value-based entry and exit 
fee is charged on British-style CFD platforms.  
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derivative contract is maintained and the larger the overall swap volume, 
the greater the investment bank’s profit is. 
(3) During or following the takeover, most acquirers need acquisition 
finance. While we currently experience difficulties in the market for 
acquisition finance due to the financial crisis,38 acquisition finance was a 
profitable banking market in the past, and it may be one in the future.  
(4) Finally, client-orientation adds to the bank’s reputation as service-
oriented entity. Since the people involved can be expected to be 
intertwined with other business entities, the advantages of a client-oriented 
reputation may exceed the circle of clients. For example, we frequently 
see the names of Merrill Lynch39 and Deutsche Bank40 in large-scale 
derivative transactions. 
III. Disclosure vs. Economic Incentives  
The above incentives depend, to a certain extent, on secrecy. Upon early 
disclosure, a sudden stock price increase that is greater than expected 
may force the acquirers to terminate the transaction, for lack of financing 
or since the new stock price reflects the firm’s intrinsic value. In this case, 
the acquirer’s previous investments in information and acquisition finance 
(interests, swap fees etc.) are lost. Moreover, since the acquisition of 
additional shares requires a greater investment when compared to a state 
of non-disclosure, the announcement premium prompted by early 
disclosure reduces the benefits of the overall transaction. (Early) 
                                                 
38
 See Kaplan/Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity (2008), online 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1194962; as a result, acquirers seek to avoid living up to 
their promises which explains why more M&A deals are terminated. See for example 
Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc., v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 
29, 2008). 
39
 FIAT-IFIL-EXOR (Italy); Schaeffler ./. Conti (Germany); Porsche AG’s acquisition of 
Volkswagen AG (Germany).  
40
 Perry v. Ithaca (Custodians) Ltd, Court of Appeal, New Zealand, Perry Corporation v. 
Ithaca (Custodians) Ltd, 4 November 2003, [2005] Part 4 Case 11 [NZCA]; CSX v. TCI. 
(supra n. 19); the merger of Compaq and Hewlett Packard (U.S.): In August 2003, the 
SEC fined Deutsche Bank for failing to disclose to its mutual fund investors a material 
conflict of interest with regard to its vote on the proposed HP/Compaq merger. The 
success of the merger depended on the vote. See ‘SEC Brings Settled Enforcement 
Action Against Deutsche Bank Investment Advisory Unit in Connection with Its Voting of 
Client Proxies for Merger Transaction; Imposes $750,000 Penalty’, SEC (19 August 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-100.htm. 
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disclosure also impacts on the investment banks: if the risk of termination 
materializes, the profits from the derivative scheme end, and the bank is 
prevented from further capitalizing on the economies of scale associated 
with derivative schemes (supra B.II.). Moreover, unsuccessful transactions 
do not require acquisition finance and do not add to the banks’ reputation 
to the same extent as successful transactions do. 
Mandatory disclosure of major shareholdings runs counter to the 
incentives of all parties involved in the Equity or Service Strategy. It seems 
that all participants are better off if secrecy can be maintained, and the 
timing of disclosure is determined by the parties’ plans rather than by law. 
While this is true within the context of individual transactions, there exists 
a larger question41 as to whether this state of affairs ultimately translates 
into a net benefit to these parties. Specifically, to the extent that this state 
of affairs will sometimes mean that the scheme participants will be 
outsiders to these transactions (and thus losers), there exists the 
theoretical possibility that they may end up being net losers. This calculus 
will of course be complicated by the fact that, while the scheme 
participants will be able to calculate the potential benefits of being insiders 
with some degree of precision, they will face severe informational 
problems when calculating the potential costs of being outsiders. Under 
these conditions it is likely that the parties think – only this is important! – 
that remaining is the best option they have. 
C. Inefficiency of Traditional Enforcement  
The above considerations disregard one important aspect of the 
participants’ calculations - enforcement. As ancient Thomas Hobbes 
realized, “there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to 
the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment 
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.”42 
Regulatory risk may prove costly. These costs include expenses for legal 
                                                 
41
 Thanks to Dan Awrey for this insight. 
42
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Pt 1, Chap XV “Of other laws of nature”, ¶3, p. 71; 
reprint by OUP: Oxford World Classic, p. 95). 
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defense, time and effort for dealing with regulators, and sanctions such as 
fines, criminal sanctions, or civil liability.43 However, only efficient 
enforcement is capable of countering the economic incentives for 
maintaining secrecy by imposing additional costs on wrongdoers which 
ultimately deter wrongdoers. Does traditional enforcement meet this 
requirement? 
While the applicable tools vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,44 
enforcement that seeks to detect secret acquisition strategies prior to their 
disclosure (ex ante enforcement) comprise of 1) market surveillance by 
arithmetic models through which regulators seek to detect suspicious 
trading patterns in stock markets, 2) obligations imposed on investment 
firms and / or their managers to comply, and 3) case-specific examination 
of rumors. The latter may be pursued by questioning individuals who are 
deemed to be involved. Enforcement action after disclosure of significant 
shareholdings (ex post enforcement) may result in sanctions such as 
forfeiture of shareholder rights, civil damages, administrative and 
sometimes even criminal sanctions. Variants of ex post enforcement 
constitute the cooling-off period, i.e. a regulator bans the acquirer from 
issuing a bid, or further acquisition of shares. Some regulators may also 
require the participants to sell their shares (over the stock exchange, or 
to someone else, as the case may be). In addition, financial intermediaries 
and other entities subject to licensing may lose their license for financial 
services; the individuals involved may be subject to director 
disqualification and/or administrative or criminal sanctions.  
                                                 
43
 For example, s. 16 (b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for 
recovery of short-wsing profits stemming from violation of disclosure rules by the issuer. 
For an example in the CSX ./. TCI ase, see Mirvis, Hedge Funds Settle “Short Swing” 
Profits Litigation, 28 December 2008 (The Harvard Corporate Governance Blog).,For 
Germany, it is argued that (former) shareholders may engage in securities litigation, see 
H Hirte in H. Hirte in Hirte & Möllers (eds.), Kölner Kommentar zum 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, (Cologne, Heymanns, 2007), Commentary to s. 21 of the 
Securities Trading Law, at n. 196; UH Schneider, Introduction to ss. 21 et seq. WpHG, in 
H.D. Assmann and U.H. Schneider, eds., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 4th edn. (Cologne, 
Otto Schmidt, 2006), at n. 16. 
44
 See for the US *; for the UK *; for Germany *; for Canada *; for Switzerland *; for the 
Netherlands *. 
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Traditional enforcement of shareholder transparency rules does not turn 
the incentives against disclosure into a pro-disclosure situation.   
I. Co-relation of Ex ante and Ex post Enforcement 
Under the strategies described above, the individual’s intentions and the 
inter-personal relationship between different legal entities mandates 
disclosure. Even assuming that technical devices would provide for perfect 
market oversight – which is not the case for a number of reasons relating 
to the chain of intermediaries that act worldwide on behalf of multiple 
clients -45, without information on the subjective side (i.e. the participants’ 
plans and intentions), enforcement reveals different entities acquiring a 
number of shares which may be related to each other, or not. Trading 
patterns rarely reflect these personal relationships clearly.  
With respect to compliance and unsophisticated whistle blowing rules,46 
compliance, or blowing the whistle, will only come into practice if the 
unlawful behavior is likely to be (severely) sanctioned at a later point in 
time or if the incentives of the whistle-blower sufficiently diverge from 
those of the firm which they represent. In the absence of sanctions being 
provided in the future, from the perspective of the financial services firm, 
the risk-adjusted profit from complying is Zero, while the economic and 
reputational loss is significant. The same is true on the individual level: 
                                                 
45
 With respect to shareholder identification, I Gómez-Sancha Trueba, “Indirect holdings 
of securities and exercise of shareholder rights (a Spanish perspective)”, (2008) 3 Oxford 
University Capital Markets Law Journal 32; M Kahan & E Rock, “The Hanging Chads of 
corporate voting,”, (2008) 96 The Georgetown Law Journal 1227; Paul Myners, Review of 
the impediments to voting UK shares – report to the Shareholder Voting Working Group 
(1/2004), while improvements are reported in the 2008 update; RC Nolan, ”Indirect 
Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?”, (2003) 3:1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
73; Matthias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge University Press: 
2008), at 133-138; Dirk A. Zetzsche, Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, (2008) 8:2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289. 
46
 See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner 
Circles, (2004) Oregon L. Rev. 83:2, 435; Kristoffel Grechenig, Positive and Negative 
Information - Insider Trading Rethought, in: Gregoriou/Ali, Insider Trading - Global 
Developments and Analysis (CRC Press 2009) 245, chapter 15.6. The 1998’s British 
Public Interest Disclosure Act provides for “protected disclosures” cases involving 
investment banks include Bhatia v Sterlite Industries (2001) and two cases related to 
investment bank Nomura. For a sophisticated whistle blowing scheme, see the following 
text. 
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unless actors are driven by morality, or seek to retaliate,47 whistle blowing 
is unlikely to happen, or at least, it is unlikely to happen early. For the 
same reason, regulatory proceedings ex ante have little prospect of 
revealing relevant agreements if the respective behavior is unlikely to be 
sanctioned in the future. Effectiveness of ex ante measures depends on 
the effectiveness of ex post enforcement. 
II. Ex post enforcement: No Market-Based Pricing 
For the most part, the above sanctions do not change the fact that the 
acquisition has not been priced by the market, as it would have been if the 
acquisition was disclosed appropriately. Enforcement does not make the 
takeover subject to a true market test that enables market participants to 
assess the consequences and the seriousness of the takeover attempt.48  
If regulators let the acquisition proceed (regardless of penalties being 
imposed on the bidder), due to inefficient time and planning, competitors 
are unlikely to issue a competing bid: Instigating a potentially unsuccessful 
bidding war is costly. By virtue of the Equity and / or the Service Strategy 
the scheme participants, or the acquirer, respectively enjoy a headstart in 
the takeover bid. They have assembled a significant, sometimes even 
controlling stake at low costs. Without these stakes, taking over the issuer 
may turn out to be difficult. In addition, if the scheme secured a low stock 
price for its base stake, its overall takeover costs are lesser than those of 
a competing bidder even if it offers a higher price for the (remaining) 
outstanding shares of the target later on. If the competitor succeeds it 
does so by paying a significant premium from which inter alia the scheme 
participants / the acquirer (a competitor?) benefit.  
These aspects lead to a lesser number of competing bids than is 
desirable, from the shareholders’ perspective. Moreover, once the 
acquirer’s stake has passed the control threshold by virtue of hidden 
                                                 
47
 The same incentives may keep participants to remain loyal to the participants, see 
Sydney A. Fine, Whistle Blowing and Industrial Psychology (2006) The Industrial-
Organizational Psychologist 43:3, at 21; Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation (NJ, 
Princeton UP: 1997) at 59-60. 
48
 Admittedly, demand created from Equity and Service Strategies can be expected to 
support the target’s share price even in the absence of disclosure. 
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strategies, its interest in acquiring further shares may be limited. They may 
issue a mandatory bid at the minimum price.  
If regulators decide in favor of banning the acquisition altogether, or 
mandating a cooling-off, they deprive shareholders of a bid altogether. 
Although not on fair, i.e. market-adjusted terms, any bid provides a put 
option to the shareholders and signals under-valuation to the market. In 
particular, in downward market cycles, a bid following a secret acquisition 
strategy may be the better option for shareholders when compared to a 
state in which there is no bid.49 Moreover, while there may be signaling 
effects and a possible transfer of proprietary information to other 
acquirers, if the bid is prohibited from going through, the acquirers’ 
investment in information and financing is reduced in value, which, from a 
social perspective, may be wasteful. 
III. Burden of Proof 
Probably the most relevant downside of traditional enforcement is that 
traditional enforcement does not overcome issues associated with the 
burden of proof. Since documentation is scarce, regulators are doomed to 
speculate about the likely content of underlying agreements; speculation 
rarely stands a critical review in court. The difficulties with evidence have 
prompted commentators50 to argue in favor of a shift in the burden of 
proof, and some lower courts51 as well as regulators52 have followed suit. 
                                                 
49
 This was the case in the Schaeffler’s bid for Continental, see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Hidden 
Ownership in Europe: BAFin’s Decision in Schaeffler v. Continental, (2009) 10:1 EBOR 
115, at 141. 
50
 For example, Reinhard H. Schmidt / Gerald Spindler, FINANZINVESTOREN AUS 
ÖKONOMISCHER UND JURISTISCHER PERSPEKTIVE (transl.: Financial investors 
from an economic and legal perspective) Nomos: 2008, at p. 250 ¶199.  
51
 See the court of first instance in re Perry vs Ithaca, [2003] 2 NZLR 216 (Potter J), 
revised by Court of Appeal, New Zealand, Perry Corporation vs Ithaca (Custodians) Ltd., 
[2005] Part 4 Case 11 [NZCA], No. 21, 25.  
52
 This is true for the Portuguese securities regulator CMVM in the cases of Semapa and 
Portugal Telecom, where the CMVM concluded from voting behavior that agreements 
existed. Similarly, the Italian regulator CONSOB applied such as doctrine when 
concluding that an implicit agreement existed in the FIAT-IFIL / EXOR case, See 
L.Curran and F. Turitto, ‘Fiat/ Ifil: The Securities Law Implications for Equity Derivatives’, 
21:7 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (JIBFL) (2006) p. 298; G. 
Ferrarini, Prestito Titoli e Derivati Azionari nel Governo Societario in 
Balzarini/Carcano/Ventoruzzo, La società per azioni oggi: Tradizione, attualità e 
prospettive.– Vol II (The corporation today: tradition, presence and future), (Venice, 
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These institutions held that in certain situations prima facie evidence re the 
illegality of a hidden acquisition suffices for the imposition of sanctions, or 
mandating a cooling-off.  
Shifting the burden of proof has obvious disadvantages: generally 
speaking, the risk is imposed on the acquirer that any conduct is deemed 
unlawful. Since such a scheme renders takeovers less likely, it reduces 
incentives for information production about under-valued issuers. As a 
potential response to shifting the burden of proof, bidders might 
reasonably elect to incur greater costs to ensure compliance with - and to 
be seen complying with - the relevant legal requirements. To the extent 
that such compliance costs increase the overall costs associated with any 
potential bid, they decrease the marginal likelihood that bids will develop in 
the first place. 
Moreover, the regulators’ task is assigned to the acquirers. The fact that 
acquirers may be deemed to be culprits (with related administrative or 
criminal sanctions) in the absence of evidence or defections prompts 
constitutional concerns. When subject to appeal, shifting the burden of 
proof partially or entirely to the acquirer has not withstood critical review.53 
D. A Reward Model 
If authorities fail to enforce existing rules, designing new rules does not 
seem to be the obvious idea. Instead, we may focus on enforcement. In 
particular, a reward model that overcomes said disincentives is desirable.  
                                                                                                                                     
Giuffrè 2007), at 629 and 663 pp.; S. Bragantini, ‘Se l’equity swap dribbla la 
comunicazione’, (When equity swaps dribble the communication) (Lavoce) (25 
September 2005), with the response by Gabetti (Lavoce) (25 September 2005), available 
at: http://www.lavoce.info. For the CONSOB decisions against Ifil (market manipulation) 
see Delibera (decision) n. 15760, 9 February 2007; against Exor (wrongful disclosure) 
see Delibera n. 16068, 1 August 2007; and against Merrill (wrongful disclosure), Delibera 
n. 16248, 1 December 2007, available at: http://www-consob.it. Ifil, Exor and Merrill 
appealed to the CONSOB decisions at the Corte D’Appello di Torino [Torino Court of 
Appeal]. On 5 December 2007, the sanction against Ifil was upheld, while the sanction 
against Exor was rejected due to a procedural problem, see Case 214/07 VG, available 
at: http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/decreti_ca/2007/ca_20071205_torino_IFIL.htm. 
53
 See references supra n.s 51 and 52. 
- 27 - 
I. The Antitrust Analogy 
For such a model, we need to understand each participant’s incentives. 
Once the scheme engaged in a violation of disclosure rules each 
participant faces two options: (1) (early) disclosure, or (2) silence. As a 
starting point, assuming for reasons of simplicity54 a circumventive scheme 
with one hidden acquisition opportunity, perfect information, two 
participants, no distinction between participating firms and the individuals 
representing them, no transactions costs and inefficient ex-post 
enforcement, the chart of the strategies available to each participant can 
be drawn as follows:55 
Table 1: Incentives under Traditional Enforcement 
Participant A / B Disclosure (B) Silence (B) 
Disclosure (A) P(A)t0 - F(A)’; P(B)t0 - F(B)’ P(A)t0 - F(A)’; P(B)t0 - F(B) 
Silence (A) P(A)t0 -F(A); P(B)t0 - F(B)’ α x P(A) t1; α x P(B) t1 
 
P (A;B) denotes the profits made by participants A, B from the stock price 
reaction due to disclosure at two points in time t0 (early disclosure) and t1 
(later disclosure); α|[0<α<1] denotes the probability of detection of the 
scheme in the future, and F (A;B) denotes any penalty (‘fine’) resulting from 
disclosure. F includes administrative fines, criminal prosecution, litigation 
by investors that received too little when selling their shares under 
circumstances of inaccurate information, or costs for defence against any 
charges resulting from the disclosure. Early disclosure may reduce the 
size of F(A;B), since defection reduces the fines set by official bodies 
(agencies, judges) and, since fewer shareholders traded under 
circumstances of inaccurate disclosure, there is less potential for investor 
litigation. While the latter benefit is shared by all participants, only the 
defector benefits from the former. In turn, defectors may suffer from 
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 The qualifications will be turned into a real world setting in the following sections infra. 
55
 The model will be narrowed down further down below. 
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punishment by fellow wrongdoers in future acquisitions. In any event, the 
size of F is likely different in the state of early disclosure than in the state 
of silence. My model considers this aspect as F(A;B)’. This does not 
change the fact that any F is a cost (F > 0).  
Since ex post enforcement is inefficient (see above), i.e. α → 1, the size of 
the expected future profit at t1 is not significantly reduced by risk 
considerations. As long as P(A;B)t0 < P(A;B)t1, i.e. the stock price premium 
(announcement effect) at the time of early disclosure (t0) is lesser than at a 
later point in time t1, there, is any P(A;B)t0 - F(A;B)’ < P(A;B)t1. Under that 
condition, if A and B remain silent, they will do simultaneously better than 
in the case of joint or individual disclosure.  
The participants’ decisions suffer from bounded rationality56 in terms of 
accurately forecasting the announcement effect; they cannot look into the 
future nor can they estimate with certainty whether there is P(A;B)t0 < 
P(A;B)t1. They don’t need to. Rather than an objective calculus it is each 
participant’s opinion that drives decision-making. Each participant is likely 
to make its personal calculus in order to determine whether it thinks that 
there is P(A;B)t0 < P(A;B)t1. If they do, they will remain silent. 
Notwithstanding any leak of information which renders early disclosure by 
other participants likely, cooperation gets all participants to remain silent 
and guarantees a net profit. Even in the absence of future opportunities 
silence is the collusive equilibrium. In particular, participants do not face a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma as there is no incentive to defect. 
In reality, we observe n-person schemes.57 However, due to the binary 
nature of the decision, we can understand A and B in the model above as 
any sub-coalition in the group of n participants that discloses the scheme 
or remains silent, as applicable. Example: Group A may consist of 
participants 1 and 2 who are willing to disclose, while B represents all 
                                                 
56
 See Herbert Alexander Simon, Theories of decision making in economics and 
behavioural science, (1959) American Economic Review 49:3, pp. 253 - 283. 
57
 See on n-person schemes Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory – Analysis of Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA, HUP: 1997), at 417 et seq.; for a general theory of n-person games and 
its application to economics see John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, 1944, Sixtieth Anniversary Edition 2004, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press: 2004, S. 238 ff.. 
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other participants 3 – n who wish to maintain secrecy. The essential 
message of above model will not change. 
This incentive structure is similar to the incentives of cartel participants 
prior to the detection of the cartel by antitrust authorities.58 Extending the 
principle that wrongdoers who report their misdeeds can expect less harsh 
punishment,59 U.S. as well as European antitrust law provides for leniency, 
i.e. the first antitrust violator disclosing the cartel benefits from lenient 
regulatory treatment.60 Leniency aims to destabilize cartels, and ultimately 
to detect cartels through defection. By reducing the expected fine F (A;B) 
for the defector, leniency disseminates distrust within the cartel: if one 
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 See C.R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, (2006) 31 
Journal of Corporation Law 453; Leslie, Cartels, agency costs, and finding virtue in 
faithless agents, (2008) 49:5 William and Marie Law Review 1621; N. Zingales, European 
and American Leniency Programme: Two Models Towards Convergence? (2007) (On 
SSRN). 
59
 The social desirability of this ancient principle of Criminal Law that is also vested in 
theology and philosophy, has been shown by, inter alia, by L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, 
Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting Behavior, (1994) 102:3 Journal of Political 
Economy 583-606. Example of this principle include the U.S. style plea bargain and the 
German public attorney’s discretion to cancel a criminal proceeding if there is no need for 
a public hearing in front of the judge. 
60
 For the U.S. see US Department of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm  (1993) and Leniency Policy for 
Individuals, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm (1993), as 
well as US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, online 
http://www.ussc.gov/2009guid/GL2009.pdf (as of 1 November 2009).Under the Antitrust 
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, Title 2, §§ 
211-214, 118 Stat. 661, 666-668, a leniency applicant may qualify for detrebling of 
damages if the applicant cooperates with plaintiffs in their civil actions while the 
applicant's former co-conspirators will remain liable for treble damages on a joint and 
several basis. Relevant information on US-leniency is available at the DoJ’s “leniency 
website”:  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.htm ; for Europe “2006 
Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases”, 
2006/C298/11, OJ C 298/17 (hereafter EU Leniency Notice), as well as the “2006 – 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23 (2)(a) of 
Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ C 210/2; out of the rich body of literature see M. Bigoni, S-O.. 
Fridolfsson, C. Le Coq & G. Fines Spagnolo, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: 
Evidence from Antitrust Experiments (20/05/2008). SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in 
Economics and Finance No. 698. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134725; 
Panizza, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WETTBEWERBSRECHT 2008, 58; G. Spagnolo, Leniency 
and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, in Bucirossi (Ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 
M.I.T.: 2007 (cited from Working Paper version) at 10 et seq.; Wouter P. J. Wils, Leniency 
in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice. (2007) World Competition: Law and 
Economics Review, 30:1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=939399; 
Wissmann/Dreyer/Witting, KARTELL- UND REGULIERUNGSBEHÖRDLICHE 
ERMITTLUNGEN IM UNTERNEHMEN UND RISIKOMANAGEMENT (transl.: antitrust 
and regulatory proceedings and risk management) (2008), Chpt. 5 and 8. For a critical 
assessment see M. Motta & M. Polo, Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (2003) 
21:3 International Journal of Industrial Organization 347. 
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cartel participant can benefit from harming others, it may as well seek 
certainty in the arms of the regulator rather than continuing to bear the 
(uncertain) risk that others participants defect.61  
Both cartels and secret acquisition schemes keep price-sensitive 
information hidden from the markets. On a first look account, Equity and 
Service Strategies run an information cartel regarding major 
shareholdings.  
A second look results in a more careful judgment. Three characteristics 
are peculiar for cartels:62 (1) the involvement of multiple agents; (2) within 
the wrongdoers, there is scope for profitable defecting, and (3) due to the 
illegality of the underlying activity, contracts that limit opportunism vis-à-vis 
the fellow cartelists cannot be enforced. Conditions (1) and (3) apply to 
secret acquisition schemes: at least two agents63 are likely to conspire. 
Condition (2) is case specific. In some cases early disclosure creates 
opportunity for arbitrage, in others defecting on the participants is not 
profitable per se, as the defector may not undercut its fellows by early 
disclosure combined with an early sale. However, the potential lack of 
condition (2) does not render drawing lessons from antitrust leniency in 
vain: In a state where economics do not incentivize abiding by the rules, 
there is an even greater need to create incentives in favor of defection as 
compared to a state where there is an economic incentive to defect as in 
the case of cartels. (Please note that it is not a precondition of a cartel that 
all participants profit to the same extent - one cartel participant may hold a 
dominating share in the market -, or that all cartel participants know all the 
others. Similarly, with respect to secret acquisitions, one participant may 
be the instigator who wants to purchase the shares from the fellow 
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 Traditional Whistle Blowers and Crown Witnesses find themselves in similar situations. 
However, while the benefit of disclosure is determined by law, in the latter cases it is 
somewhat blurred to what extent the parties benefit from maintaining secrecy. 
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 Buccirossi & Spagnolo, Corporate Governance and Collusive Behavior, in Dale W. 
Collins (Ed.), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, 2007, Antitrust Section, American 
Bar Association, Chapter XX, sub 5. 
63
 Equity strategy: two investors working together; Service strategy: Acquirer and core 
intermediary. 
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participants after the takeover succeeded, or be the only party fully 
cognizant of what is going on.) 
Thus, a closer look at the mechanics of antitrust leniency is warranted. For 
cartelists reducing fines does neither infer that defection is efficient,64 nor 
that defection is costless to the defector.65 Leniency is traditionally applied 
to organizations 1) that are intrinsically unstable because each participant 
has an incentive to defect even in the absence of leniency (in the case of 
cartels, to undercut other cartelists by offering a better, yet still profitable 
price to their customers),66 and 2) where traditional enforcement activities 
impose a significant threat on cartel participants to be detected even in the 
absence of defection.67 Through traditional enforcement, agencies seek to 
achieve a situation in which the calculus of all cartelists for silence (and, 
hence, an internal system of cartel discipline and punishment) includes a 
realistic probability that the cartel is detected, and its participants being 
severely punished, regardless of silence. This includes presenting some 
minor charges with good evidence in order to extract new evidence 
relating to fellow cartelists through the use of leniency.  
With respect to shareholder transparency rules, 1) participants are not per 
se incentivized to defect (see above), and 2) there are no related minor 
offences that could be invoked by the agencies. Moreover, while a cartel is 
maintainable in the long run,68 the Equity and Service Strategy does not 
endlessly benefit from secrecy. While secrecy is necessary for a certain 
period of time in order to assemble the significant stake in the issuer,69 at 
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 Consider the effect of F (A;B)’ < F (A;B); under inefficient enforcement, silence remains 
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 Leniency reduces fines, but some fines remain. In addition, the defector bears 
sanctions by fellow cartelists. 
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 G. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, (1964) 72:1 Journal of Political Economy 44-61. 
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Law Review 123, at 133. 
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a certain point in time, acquirers need to go public in order to profit from 
their strategy: All feasibilities to increase the value of the participant’s 
investment - the announcement premium, governance changes due to 
coercion by the acquirers, or strategic changes following a takeover - 
require disclosure of the joint stake (albeit not defection). For 
circumventive schemes in the domain of shareholder transparency rules to 
be successful, the secret informational advantage must be transformed in 
real-world premiums. 
However, when all other factors (the number of participants, the profits 
etc.) are equal,70 it is more likely that one wrongdoer defects the longer the 
scheme is run. Moreover, external effects (like other investors’ complaints, 
technical market supervision etc.) render detection of a long-run scheme 
more likely than detection of a scheme run for a short period of time. The 
short period of time required for successfully applying the Equity or 
Service Strategy, in addition to the disincentives to defect, makes it 
particularly hard to reveal secret acquisitions schemes. Therefore, the 
incentives in favor of disclosure of major shareholdings have to be greater, 
in relative terms, when compared to antitrust leniency programs.  
Since leniency, i.e. reducing fines, does not suffice for inducing disclosure 
in an environment in which fines are unlikely in the first place, I propose a 
whistleblower reward policy.71 This idea is not alien to the law: Inter alia, a 
reward policy was part of the very first British stock broker regulation in the 
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 Each participant re-calculates its chances more often and has more opportunities to 
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17th century.72 Moreover, collaboration with authorities is rewarded by the 
U.S. False Claim Act, for employees that reveal fraud to the federal 
government,73 by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Amnesty Plus program 
in antitrust74 as well as in South-Korean competition law.75 Reward policies 
worked well in Italy (in fighting the Mafia and Terrorism)76 and have been 
used for catching “wanted” criminals for centuries by offering bounties to 
fellow criminals as much as non-involved people. Moreover, albeit most 
often not a wrongdoer, one may understand the auditor,77 or the 
compliance officer, who is to report to independent directors, or the 
supervisory board, as the case may be, as person rewarded for blowing 
the whistle. The idea of rewards in return for disclosure is not alien to the 
law as a first glance suggests. New, though, is its application as 
enforcement measure in the context of Securities Law. 
II. Key Assumptions 
A reward policy must be carefully crafted in order to prevent exploitation 
as much as issues with retributive (in-)justice. In determining which 
premium should be assigned to the first discloser, I make three 
assumptions: 
                                                 
72 See Robert R. Pennington, The Law of Investment Management, 1990, p. 29. 
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First, I assume that there is no hard evidence regarding the specific 
violation of disclosure rules that dawn raids and other ex-post devices may 
unmantle. Whether regulatory pressure is successful primarily depends on 
one participant defecting by admitting the existence of the scheme to 
regulators, or by publicly disclosing the major shareholding earlier than 
other wrongdoers expected. The relatively few cases in which backward-
oriented regulatory diligence resulted in regulatory sanctions, provide a 
factual foundation for this assumption.  
Secondly, I assume that the longer the acquisition strategy remains 
undisclosed, the larger the proportion of the target’s share the participants 
can assemble without the market noticing is.  
Third, I assume that stock prices will respond to first time disclosure of 
major shareholdings by abnormal returns. I disregard any price adjustment 
resulting from the strategic or industrial logic of the takeover. While studies 
show significant abnormal returns in case of disclosure of hedge fund 
activity,78 it is unclear what prompts these effects, given that the same 
studies show significant abnormal losses one year following these 
disclosures. One would expect markets to anticipate these long term 
losses and even out abnormal returns, in the first place. For the purposes 
of this model, this riddle is willfully disregarded.79 
In order to reveal the impact of the reward policy, I will go on to define the 
Premium (E.III.) and analyze its impact on the Equity Strategy (E.IV.) and 
the Service Strategy (E.V.) separately.  
III. Defining the Premium 
Given that all participants invest in the target’s shares, the joint holding of 
the group exceeds the holding of each participant. If there is a significant 
stock price reaction upon announcement of the major shareholding, each 
participant benefits from the Announcement Premium to the same extent 
as it holds shares in the issuer. The group’s collective profits are greater 
than each of the participant’s profits; they are the sum of each participant’s 
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profits.80 I suggest that law assigns the Announcement Premium on the 
shares held by the group to the first participant81 disclosing the scheme to 
the market. I refer to the discloser’s claim stemming from this legal 
distribution of cash-flows as ‘Premium Claim’ (‘PC’).  
Example: Wrongdoers A (holding 1%) and B (holding 4%) hold jointly a 
5% stake in target T. Upon A’s early disclosure (deflection), T’s market 
capitalization jumps from 5 Bio. to 6 Bio. A is granted a Premium Claim 
worth 5% of 1 Bio. against B, i.e. 50 Mio. The Premium Claim is reduced 
by A’s own share in the overall stake (i.e. 10 Mio.) leaving him with B’s 
profits made upon announcement (40 Mio.). In addition, A enjoys leniency 
with respect to administrative penalties and is excluded as target of 
investor suits for wrongful disclosure.82 
The Premium Claim reflects the information value related to disclosure of 
the major shareholding. If the market does not respond to disclosure, 
foregoing disclosure will not harm anyone; in this case, disclosure is not a 
valuable service to the market that warrants reimbursement. If the market, 
in fact, responds to disclosure – the fact that all parties have refrained 
from disclosure up to defection indicates that all participants (prior to 
disclosure) came to the conclusion that P(A;B)t0 < P(A;B)t1 83 –  the 
Premium Claim deprives the loyal participants of their benefits from 
secrecy. The remaining participants forego the abnormal returns 
associated with the Announcement Premium. In terms of return, the 
participants are back to the start. In the aftermath of such disclosure, 
traditional enforcement is likely to be more effective, since the defector 
provides enforcement agencies with good information. Litigation by 
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 Let AP describe the announcement effect, p(i) the individual participant’s share in the 
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 See supra D.I. 
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investors that sold their shares at the wrong price and administrative 
sanctions may impose further costs on the non-defecting participants; 
regulators may require, ban or stand-by a takeover bid as the case may 
be.  
A look at the incentive structure based on the same conditions as Table 1 
(supra) reveals the impact of the Premium Claim on the scheme. Let PC 
be the Premium Claim, as defined above, and PC(A;B) be the fraction of 
the Premium Claim which A or B have to pay to the defector upon early 
disclosure. Under the reward model, the alternative strategies look like: 
Table 2: Incentives under Reward Policy 
Participant A / B Disclosure (B) Silence (B) 
Disclosure (A) P(A)t0 - F(A)’; P(B)t0 - F(B)’ PC; P(B)t0 - F(B) - PC(A) 
Silence (A) P(A)t0 -F(A) - PC(A); PC α x P(A) t1; α x P(B) t1 
 
Since the Premium Claim is defined as the announcement effect on the 
joint-stake of participants 1 – n, while A or B may only profit in proportion 
of their own fraction of the scheme which is P(A;B), and 0 < α < 1, there is 
any α x P(A;B)t1 < PC. If the Premium Claim is assigned to the first 
defector, remaining silent does not provide for A and B simultaneously the 
best solution: It is impossible to maximize the value of two (or more) 
independent84 functions at the same time.85 Instead, the only way for both 
participants simultaneously to make a profit is if both disclose jointly and 
simultaneously, given that for each A and B Pt0 > F’. The logical 
consequence for A and B is to collude - by joint disclosure. If A and B – 
each independently – come to the conclusion that they have to disclose 
anyway, as otherwise they will not profit from the scheme, they may as 
                                                 
84
 That is: f(A) ╪ z x f(B). 
85
 See John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior, 1944, Sixtieth Anniversary Edition 2004, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press: 2004, S. 10 f. (obviously, it is possible to determine the greatest joint 
value). 
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well make sure that F is as small as possible. This means: they disclose 
as late as possible, as long as F = 0. In other words, A and B would agree 
on disclosure in accordance with disclosure rules. This is exactly what we 
want them to do.  
IV. The Equity Strategy 
The incentive structure provided in the previous sections relied on the 
premise of a one-sequence-setting, i.e. the participants do not see each 
other again after they decided to cash in the Premium Claim. In the real 
world, this condition may not hold. Given this further complexity, how does 
the Premium Claim impact on the Equity Strategy?  
1. Expected Future Pay-Off 
For the Equity Strategy, the Premium Claim creates an Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma86 among the participants, with two qualifications: (1) participants 
know ex ante that they will be placed in this dilemma, and (2) participants 
can communicate.87 Robert J. Aumann has shown that rational actors 
determine their strategy (cooperation, deflection) with regard to the 
discounted value of the future payoff of each strategy.88 Participants seek 
to assess, in light of the significant uncertainty regarding future stock price 
developments and other participants’ incentives and (irrational?) motives, 
which risk scenario (disclosure / non-disclosure) if adjusted to risk, results 
in the greatest payoff.  
The holdings of Scheme 1 will be disclosed if the sum of the risk-adjusted 
discounted value of the Premium Claim [PC] minus transaction costs (for 
example, legal advice, litigation) [TC] minus the sum of the risk-adjusted 
discounted future profits [P] from all cooperative schemes 2-n where 
                                                 
86
 Please note that in the absence of a reward scheme there is not a prisoner’s dilemma 
since, in most cases, there is no economic incentive to defect. 
87
 For potential consequences of these qualifications see infra D. IV.4. 
88
 See Robert J. Aumann, Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games, in 
H.W. Kuhn and R.D. Luce (eds.), CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES IV, 
Princeton, PUP: 1959, at 287 et seq*; Aumann, Repeated Games with Incomplete 
Information (1995)* and Collected Papers - Vol. 1 (2000), at *. 
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participation and payoffs depend on whether the participant defected in 
Scheme 1,89 is greater than Zero.90  
Fig 4: Premium Claim vs. Expected Future Cash-Flows from Cooperation 
 
 
It is reasonable to assume that TC1 is low, in relative terms, if the defector 
acts according to the law. Whether the Premium Claim results in 
disclosure depends for the most part on the expected future pay-off from 
projects in which the defector cannot cooperate since it is excluded from 
participation due to its defection at this project.91  
An ideal model would provide an equilibrium under which no participant is 
interested in the scheme’s collective stake in the target surpassing a 
disclosure threshold without disclosure, for fear of defection by other 
participants that seek to capitalize on the Premium Claim. However, as 
long as the participants assume that (1) the size of the Premium Claim 
correlates with the size of the joint shareholding of all participants, and (2) 
all (other) participants stay honest, any potential defector in the team has 
reasons to maintain the strategy rather than disclose.  
2. Correlation of Premium Claim with joint shareholding 
The first assumption – i.e. that the announcement premium is greater, the 
more shares the participants assemble – holds water in the low digit 
range. Upon disclosure, the greater joint share of the participants signals 
greater commitment which in turn signals a more significant under-
evaluation of the target’s stock. This assumption may not hold if the joint 
                                                 
89
 Retaliation is likely as the individuals involved have memories (while markets do not). 
For cartels see Zingales, supra n. 58, at 26. Exclusion is the most likely type of retaliation 
in the sphere of finance. Alternatively, investors could lure the defector in a trap, by 
setting up a scheme designed to recuperate the losses from Scheme 1 in a set-up 
Scheme 2.  
90
 My model disregards the costs of financing the said project. Given the short period of 
time required for the scheme itself to work, the time value of money plays a minor role for 
the assessment.  
91
 The incentives diverge if the Premium Claim is granted to individuals (agents, 
employees) rather than the participants. See infra D.V.3. 
PC1 – TC1 – ∑(P2-n) > 0 
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share comes close to or even reaches de facto control.92 After de facto 
control has changed hands, two key drivers of the stock price, defensive 
measures and a competing bid, are unlikely from the outset. Further stock 
price reactions may, however, stem from legal requirements, such as the 
mandatory bid rule or specific investor protection schemes.93 Please note 
that secrecy beyond de facto control is rare; disclosure of de facto control 
is necessary for exercising control. If the participants’ joint stake is that 
large, regulatory scrutiny (albeit unsuccessful) will increase transaction 
costs. Moreover, in some cases, disclosure of new de facto control may 
reduce the stock price, since it ends speculation about possible acquirers. 
3. Infinite Secret Acquisitions Game 
If in the low digit range the Premium Claim grows by waiting, any potential 
defector’s further hesitation to disclose depends on the second 
assumption that other participants do not defect. As was pointed out 
above, whether the Premium Claim results in disclosure in an infinite 
setting depends for the most part on the expected future pay-off of 
projects from which the defector is excluded.  
It is helpful for the reward model that future pay-offs count less than 
present pay-offs, because the individuals involved do not know whether 
another opportunity will come up where avoiding disclosure rules results in 
profits. The future pay-off is only a fraction of the present.94  
Example: Let d (discount parameter) describe the discount relative to the 
previous move. If there is d = ½, i.e. a 50% chance to meet again, the loss 
from early disclosure would comprise of one full loss (1) for the current 
project (p1), only 50% for p2 (1/2), 25% for p3 (1/4) and so on (1/8; 1/16; 
1/32 etc.). If all future projects resulted in the same profit, the cumulative 
                                                 
92
 Please note that I distinguish between de facto control, which is the ability to decide 
corporate matters depending on shareholder votes, and legal control, which prompts the 
mandatory bid under Article 5 of the Takeover Directive (supra n. 28). 
93
 Examples include the Evaluation Proceeding (‘Spruchverfahren’) where in the 
aftermath of corporate transactions, the consideration for minority shareholders is review 
by the courts. 
94
 See Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
Three Solutions, (1970) Journal of Conflict Resolution 14: 181-194. 
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value of the sequence is 2 x p1.95 Under that condition, defectors would 
forego only the double profits of participation in the current project. In the 
absence of transaction costs, defection would be likely if PC < 2 p1. Under 
these conditions (50% chance to meet again, same profit as p1), one more 
participant needs to hold a stake of the same, or a larger, size as the 
defector in order to make disclosure a profitable strategy. A 90% chance 
to meet again would require a reward 10 times the current profits, while for 
a 10% chance any reward greater than the profit incentivizes disclosure.96  
However, neither the first model assumption that participants calculate the 
probability to meet again nor the second that all future projects result in 
the same profit97 can be transferred in the real world. In reality, there is 
significant uncertainty both with respect to the ‘if’ (chance to meet again) 
and the ‘how’ (expected profits) of future opportunities.  
Responding to this uncertainty, wrongdoers may apply TIT-FOR-TAT, i.e. 
a strategy which cooperates on the first move and then does whatever the 
other player did on the previous move.98 According to that pattern, in a 
perennial game with uncertain information, as long no one else defects, 
we would expect no participant to defect either, as TIT-FOR-TAT results, 
                                                 
95
 The definite value of the infinite sequence S (1/2; ¼; 1/8, etc.) is 1, since S is a 
geometric series i.e. a series where each term is r times the previous term. For geometric 
series if the first term is x, the value (V) of S is: V = x + x r + x r^2 + x r^3 + xr^4, etc. V(S) 
can be calculated by multiplying the equation by r and subtracting the second equation 
from the first equation. That is: V – r V = x => V = x / (1-r). Economists use geometric 
series in order to calculate the present value of a steady stream of cash flows. 
In the example, there is x = ½ and r = 1/2. => (1) V = 0.5 (1-0.5); (2) V = 0.5/0.5 = 1. 
96
 A changing probability impacts on the outcome, as the cumulative value is ∑ (1 + d2 + 
d3+ d4 …. + dn), or 1/(1-d). Please note that d (as probability) is less than one and the 
minimum foregone profit is the expected profit from the current project. 
97
 There are no obvious probabilities for the future course of stock markets. In terms of 
Game Theory, the course is a “subjective unknown”. See Myerson (supra n. 57), at 6. 
98
 This simple pattern by Anatol Rapoport of the University of Toronto performed best in 
the two-person, zero-sum, infinitely Iterated Prisoner Dilemma that was the basis for 
Axelrod’s experiment on whether, and which type of, cooperation would turn out to pay 
off. Axelrod drew far-reaching conclusions from this result to the real world, see Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (NYC, Basic Books: 1984, revised ed. 2006), at 
54: “What accounts for TIT-FOR-TAT’s robust success is its combination of being nice, 
retaliatory, forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary 
trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is 
tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible 
to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.” TIT-FOR-TAT does not work 
in an n-person setting, see Axelrod, supra n. 47, at 44. 
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from an overall perspective, in the best outcome.99 However, activist 
hedge funds100 or private equity funds – these are the entities engaged in 
the Equity Strategy – are not perennial players. These entities are set up 
for a limited period of time, due to tax reasons, and interested in 
increasing the overall success of the fund as this is the determinative 
figure for the manager’s carried interest.101 While some fund managers 
seek to continue their career as fund managers, or run more than one fund 
– these managers have reason to invest in a reputation as an honest 
player in the secret acquisition game -102, other funds do not belong to a 
fund family; in addition, many of these funds are short-lived.103 The 
managers of these funds find themselves under significant pressure. Bad 
performance may prompt investors to request redemption of their shares. 
At the same time, taking home a safe albeit large extraordinary return 
enhances the manager’s carried interest. These fund managers may 
prefer the safe bet of early disclosure over loyalty vis-à-vis the other 
participants by maintaining secrecy. This is particularly true since loyalty 
may come along with regulatory risks if one of the other participants gives 
in to the incentives provided by the Premium Claim. 
Consequently, whether disclosure will happen or not, is highly case-
specific, along the following lines:  
                                                 
99
 Axelrod, supra n. 98, p. 12. 
100
 A mere 3% of hedge funds pursue an activist strategy.  
101
 Carried interest refers to a share of profits granted to the general partners of private 
funds as compensation, despite not contributing any initial funds. See Timothy Spangler, 
A Practitioner’s Guide to Alternative Investment Funds (City & Financial Publishing, 
London: 2005), at 175 et seq. 
102
 Defecting is more costly for the reputed player than for the non-reputed player, since a 
reputed player that defects reduces the discounted future cash-flows based on that 
reputation which prompts other to ask it to participate in the scheme. Anticipating this, the 
other participants adjust the risk factor relating to defecting by the reputed participant in 
their calculations accordingly, increasing their returns. This may result in stable schemes 
including reputed players only. In such a scheme, no one is likely to defect as long as the 
expected future payoffs from their honest reputation exceed the sum of the 
Announcement Claim minus transaction costs from each individual scheme. However, if 
the Announcement Premium is very large (for example, the scheme is designed to build 
up a significant position in a very large issuer) or one of the managers finds himself in an 
end-game situation, the risk-adjusted future payoffs may be lesser than large payoffs 
provided by the Announcement Premium. In this case, there will be disclosure. 
103
 Data on fund insolvency* [tbc], 
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(1) Participants with a greater share in the scheme are more likely to 
remain honest than participants with a minor share in the scheme, in 
relative terms.104  
(2) The risk of defecting increases in correlation with the number of parties 
involved.105 Since each of the participants’ maximum share is limited by 
the respective disclosure rules, limiting the number of participants reduces 
the size of the participants’ joint share in the issuer prior to disclosure.  
(3) Participants with a reputation for being loyal wrongdoers, based on 
previous schemes, are more likely to stay honest. In the absence of 
extortion by fellow participants (see infra), loyalty depends on the 
likelihood to be involved in future schemes. The last qualification is 
important due to the destabilizing effect of “last games”. Since all 
participants assume the last gamers’ incentives to defect (since the cash-
flows from expected future projects are Zero, any reward greater than 
one’s own fraction of profits from the current scheme results in disclosure), 
they do not ask last gamers106 to participate. Thus, in the second last 
game the fund is incentivized to defecting. This, again, will be anticipated 
by the others, and so on. Potential participants meeting that test may be 
replaced by participants of an investment fund family who either have 
incentives to establish a reputation, or are run by the same managers as 
the investment funds with said reputation. In practice, however, who is a 
last gamer is not obvious. Moreover, while the participants may not be last 
                                                 
104
 Assume two participants L and S, assume further that Sh(L) describes the greater 
share, Sh(S) the smaller share in the scheme, Sh(all) the overall share and that Sh(all) > 
Sh(L) > Sh(S) and that SH(L) + Sh(S) = Sh(all). ANN refers to the relative increase of the 
issuer’s shares upon announcement. The Announcement Premium (AP) of the joint 
holding is ANN x Sh(all) = ANN x Sh(L) + ANN x Sh(M). The relative gain of Sh(L) by 
defecting is smaller than the relative gain of Sh(S). 
105
 If B is the benefit from violating the law and in order to violate the law you need N 
people to cooperate, and P is the cost (penalty) for each cooperating party, it would be 
rational to cooperate only if B/N> P; as N grows the utility from cooperation shrinks, 
rendering defection more likely. 
106
 In practice, what is a last gamer may be considered in light of the individuals involved. 
In particular, fellow participants may consider whether the leading agents (the managers) 
of the fund are likely to continue their fund manager careers.  
- 43 - 
gamers, its managers may be for reasons unrelated to the scheme.107 
Both aspects destabilize the collusion. 
(4) Enforcing the Premium Claim in court (this is part of the disclosing 
entity’s assumed transaction costs, see above) requires substantive 
details on the scheme. Participants with better information about the other 
participants’ acquisitions are more likely to disclose the scheme than 
participants not familiar with the details. The participant with the best 
information is the organizer of the scheme. Unless the instigator is 
excluded from the rewards (see infra), participants will respond by limiting 
the information provided to the organizer. This renders coordination of the 
scheme harder and increases the likelihood that the coordinated efforts 
fail. A greater probability of failure may induce participants to disclose for 
capitalizing on the Premium Claim. 
(5) In reality, participants use leverage. Debt provides for an incentive to 
run the risk of non-disclosure because the debtor may gamble and default, 
or file for insolvency, respectively, if one participant defects. If it does, it 
gambles at creditors’ cost. However, as the conditions of the reward 
system are transparent and certain, fellow participants and lenders alike 
assume the agency issues associated with debt. Wrongdoers may avoid 
highly leveraged participants for the very reason that highly leveraged 
participants may impose the Premium Claim on them without 
corresponding threat on their own. Lenders either 1) require a higher level 
of security (which renders secret acquisition schemes more expensive), 2) 
include disclosure of the scheme’s overall stake as a covenant of the debt 
contract (which renders secret acquisition schemes less likely), or 3) 
require all participants to deposit the scheme’s shares somewhere under 
its supervision, or the supervision of banks where the confidentiality 
requirements are lifted, together with a proxy to disclose the stakes if they 
exceed disclosure thresholds. In all of these cases, we may expect the 
quality of disclosure to improve. In the context of the Premium Claim, debt 
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 Example: the fund’s General Partner is split in parts due to personal reasons among 
its shareholders. 
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initiates private enforcement by market institutions. This is an desirable 
outcome. 
4. Bonding  
It was conveyed that the scheme participants find themselves in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, albeit they (1) know ex ante that they will be 
placed in this dilemma, and (2) participants can communicate.  
As a likely response, participants might seek to strengthen the ties among 
them and circumvent the requirements through further collusion. For 
example, the scheme coordinator may require other participants to provide 
security prior to being accepted as a participant. The law may render 
these counter-measures un-effective at low costs (for example, by 
declaring the underlying deposit agreement void). In any event, the reward 
model increases transaction costs for participants of an Equity Strategy, 
making it less profitable to violate disclosure rules than in the present state 
of inefficient enforcement. 
Another likely response is extortion. As a natural consequence of previous 
cooperation, wrongdoers inevitably end up having information on each 
others’ misbehavior that could be reported to law enforcers.108 Participants 
are likely to rely on those fellows about whom they have the best 
information on previous misdeeds. While the threat is not always credible 
– often, due to its involvement in said violation of rules, the extorting entity 
will bite in its own hand –, the law may respond by providing leniency (not 
rewards!) for complete reporting of previous violations, in addition to 
reporting the current one.  
V. The Service Strategy 
Transferring the results for the Equity Strategy to the Service Strategy 
requires some qualifications.  
1. Originator Unlikely to Disclose 
The (industrial) originator of the Service Strategy does not experience the 
same incentives in favor of disclosure under the Service Strategy as equity 
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 Spagnolo (2007), supra n. 59, at 4. 
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investors in the Equity Strategy. Through derivative contracts, the investor 
has availed himself of the benefits from any return stemming from the 
shares that are held by the other shareholders (i.e. financial 
intermediaries) as hedges. A stock price increase by 1 leads to an 
investor’s return of 1 x the number of underlying shares for the derivative 
contracts lesser transaction costs. The reward model developed here does 
not incentivize the originator in favor of disclosure. 
2. Financial Intermediaries: Premium to Corporate Entity  
From the intermediaries’ perspective, an efficient incentive-based model 
for the Service Strategy must consider a number of additional factors.  
a) Perennial Players 
While one bank may seek to harm competitors by demanding the 
Premium Claim, in order to raise (future) rivals’ costs,109 we may assume 
that the other banks anticipate this option and avoid participation in the 
first place. However, the banks’ most important asset is their reputation (In 
this regard, banks’ incentive diverge from the incentives of the individuals 
who represent them, see infra D.V.3.). Although banks seem to make 
profits by betting against their clients from time to time,110 banks are 
unlikely to defect as defection may cost clients in future acquisitions. From 
a game theory perspective, the banks are the equivalent of perennial 
players. In the absence of enforcement actions, these entities are unlikely 
to defect. The situation essentially changes when enforcement comes into 
play. In order to make further profits these entities must preserve their 
license for providing financial services. Since the reward policy comes 
along with leniency by enforcement agencies, banks may defect - at the 
latest point in time possible. 
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 In the current environment of the financial crisis, this consequence is less desirable as 
compared to a state of healthy financial institutions. For similar effects in the antitrust 
domain, see C. Ellis & W. Wilson, Cartels, Price-Fixing, and Corporate Leniency Policy: 
What Doesn’t Kill Us Makes Us Stronger, manuscript, University of Oregon (2002). 
110
 See Joshua Getzler, “ASIC v Citigroup: Bankers’ conflict of interest and the 
contractual exclusion of fiduciary duties”, (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 62, with further 
references. 
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b) Information Asymmetry 
As was pointed out above, the person most likely to disclose the scheme 
may be the scheme organizer due to informational advantages. This may 
be true for the core intermediary coordinating the multiple derivative 
contracts and hedging relationship. In fact, if there is a coordinator, only 
the coordinating bank may be in the position to defect on the acquirer by 
disclosing the scheme effectively. However, the core intermediary suffers 
from disincentives to disclose. These disincentives are likely to be 
particularly severe since the fees associated with large-scale derivative 
schemes will be greater than the fees for minor hedging activity. Moreover, 
the core intermediary benefits the most from a client-oriented reputation in 
the banking market following a successful takeover attempt.  
c) Taking Hostages 
To a certain extent, the acquirer may hold the banks hostage if the 
acquirer alone is entitled to terminate the derivative contracts through 
which the acquirer holds its position in the target.111 If the acquirer has 
assembled a large number of shares indirectly through the use of 
derivatives, its counterparties, or their counterparties, sit on a large 
portfolio of the target’s shares, while their economic exposure is Zero (and 
should remain Zero) due to hedging. If the acquirer terminates all of the 
derivative agreements simultaneously (which may happen in the case of 
early disclosure), the banks are suddenly exposed to risk from the 
underlying shares. At the same time, a large fraction of the overall number 
of shares may be put on the market, meaning the banks may accrue 
losses.  
Banks may protect themselves up front, by limiting the acquirer’s 
capabilities to harm their interests. For example, when negotiating the 
swap, they may ask for a minimum period of time before the swap contract 
expires after termination, or ask the acquirer for security in order to insure 
against an early termination of the swap. In addition, the law may respond 
                                                 
111
 Such a one-sided termination right was, for example, disclosed in the documents on 
Schaeffler’s bid for Continental, see Zetzsche, Hidden Ownership in Europe: BAFin’s 
Decision in Schaeffler v. Continental, (2009) 10:1 EBOR) 115, at 123, 131, 138. 
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by adding a mandatory minimum period of time for terminating the 
derivative contracts, and an extraordinary termination right for the 
discloser vis-à-vis its counterparties, as the case may require for freeing 
the intermediaries from the pressure imposed on them. However, an 
extraordinary termination right would expose intermediaries who are part 
of the hedging chain that are not involved in the Service Strategy to the 
risks of the transaction. Setting a minimum termination period would be 
equally arbitrary. An extraordinary termination right or a minimum 
termination period is not desirable. Banks are asked to take care of 
themselves.  
3. Premium to Individuals (Agents, Employees)  
If defection by financial intermediaries is unlikely regardless of the 
Premium Claim, we may create incentives pro disclosure by granting the 
Premium Claim to the intermediaries’ agents. Thereby, we decouple the 
principal’s from the agent’s interest.112 Rewarding the employees creates 
strong incentives in favor of disclosure because individuals are unable to 
play perennially due to a limited work- and lifespan.  
Granting the premium to the participant rather than individuals is likely to 
work particularly well in the fund world, since the carried interest113 
compensation scheme that is widely spread in the fund universe provides 
a similar, yet less direct personal incentive. If rewards are granted to 
agents or participants (funds, banks, industrial conglomerates, 
whatsoever), a fund manager or CEO may nevertheless decide to defect 
on behalf of the fund or the corporation in order to avoid liability vis-à-vis 
the fund investors, or the shareholders, respectively.114 
The situation is different on the side of intermediaries. Confidentiality and 
compliance requirements as well as insider trading rules prevent 
                                                 
112
 See for antitrust Leslie, Faithless Agents (2008), supra n. 58, at 1690 et seq.; Aubert, 
Kovacic and Rey, supra n. 71. 
113
 Supra n. 101. 
114
 Legal grounds include having infringed securities laws in the first place, or for 
capturing corporate opportunities. 
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employees from entering into arbitrage.115 They do capitalize on their 
superior knowledge only by virtue of their wages and annual bonuses.116 
The law may provide a lawful path to fully capitalize on it; we may think of 
this mechanism as arbitrage by virtue of law. For that purpose, the law 
needs to lift fiduciary relationships vis-à-vis the employing bank, similar to 
existing whistle blowing provisions, etc.  
Adjusting the calculus (Fig 4, supra) to defection by the agent rather than 
the participant, the holdings of Scheme 1 will be disclosed if the sum of the 
risk-adjusted discounted value of the Premium Claim [PC] minus 
transaction costs [TC] (for example, legal fees for defending claims for 
infringing the labor contract, litigation in order to secure PC) minus the 
sum of non-financial personal penalties due to the agent’s defection 
[NF] minus the sum of the risk-adjusted discounted future income [LI] (‘life 
income’) from all work opportunities which do not materialize because the 
agent disclosed the schemes to regulators, is greater than Zero.117  
Fig 5: Defection by Agent 
 
Geben Sie hier eine Formel ein. 
Again, TC1 is likely low, in relative terms, if the defector acts according to 
the law. The non-financial penalties might be significant, but cannot be 
calculated with certainty. In particular, a reputational loss among potential 
wrongdoers might be outweighed by a gain among honest people. Albeit 
there are likely switching costs, as the fact that the agent worked for 
wrongdoers renders it likely that its social environment is benevolent of 
people infringing shareholder transparency laws, or securities laws, in 
general. Regardless of the immediate pain associated with switching ones 
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 Even if they could, financial and legal limitations on arbitrage were likely to hamper 
efficient arbitrage of bank employees, see Michael C. Jensen, Arbitrage, Information 
Theft, and Insider Trading, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, London, 
1992 (on SSRN) 
116
 The latter are likely to be lower in the future as compared to the past. This may further 
incentivize legal and discourage illegal schemes. 
117
 My model disregards the costs of financing the said project. Given the short period of 
time required for the scheme itself to work, the time value of money plays a minor role for 
the assessment.  
PC1 – TC1– ∑(NF1) – ∑(LI) > 0 
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social environment, the sum of lost life income is the factor that will be 
most eminent in the agent’s calculus. As agents are risk averse, they will 
assume the worst – non employment. If the Premium Claim enables early 
retirement, defection is likely to happen. Lower ranks, employees close to 
retirement or those who expect being ousted anyway are the most likeliest 
to defect. If the Premium Claim is really high, it outweighs these 
differences. In this case, rewards to individuals may provide the pro-
disclosure incentive that rewards to banks do not achieve due to the 
perennial play.118  
Rewarding individuals renders the bank’s prospect of liability the same as 
those of participants in the Equity Strategy: If banks cannot trust their 
employees, and minor leaking may result in major liability, the expected 
future return of providing hidden acquisition services is uncertain while 
significant penalties are probable. Banks and other market intermediaries 
are particularly sensitive to potential liability, given that their profit from an 
individual transaction is small relative to the profit of the investor. It is even 
more likely that banks refrain from participation in Service Strategies than 
investors in the Equity Strategy. The same applies to other (non-bank) 
financial firmes119 acting as core-intermediaries. If there are no banks 
providing these services, the secret influence on voting rights by virtue of 
the Service Strategy is likely to vanish. This is what we seek to achieve. 
E. Facing the Real World 
Applying the incentive-based enforcement model to the real world 
necessitates further specifications. 
I. Anticipating Early Disclosure 
One of my model assumptions is that disclosure of major shareholdings 
prompts significant abnormal returns. As was previously pointed out, it is 
uncertain what prompts these returns. If these returns reflect potential 
increases stemming from investor activism, or a future voluntary bid for the 
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 Admittedly, the individual may have limited knowledge and legal capacity to enforce its 
reward. The law may respond to the former by granting only a fraction (let’s say 25% to 
50%) of the claim if the defection is not backed with good evidence, and to the latter by 
requiring regulators to assist the civil enforcement of the claim (see below). 
119
 Hedge funds sometimes do. 
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remaining shares of the issuer, the market may anticipate that disclosure 
is prompted by the Premium Claim. Whether activism or the voluntary bid 
will follow is uncertain. Anticipation would reduce the size of the Premium 
Claim, if not fully erase it. In the absence of a significant Premium Claim, 
the prospect of capitalizing on the Premium Claim does not induce 
disclosure.  
Other explanations may still hold water: If assembling of a major 
shareholding signals an under-evaluation detected by the participants, 
abnormal returns may remain. The same is true if the Announcement 
Premium reflects expectations relating to reduced management agency 
costs that are the result of better shareholder monitoring by the new 
blockholders.120 Given that there is uncertainty as to whether the Premium 
Claim reduces the incentives for the participants to a point where 
continuing the strategy is not profitable, if noise traders (i.e. uninformed 
investors) prompt the abnormal returns, these traders may continue to 
respond to disclosure. The same is true if the law requires a mandatory 
bid for all outstanding shares. 
Assuming that the defector discloses the shareholding and, if applicable, 
the participants’ original intentions relating to the issuer or its shares,121 
(while hiding the fact that other participants are opposed to disclosure), the 
market may assess the information value of this disclosure. Fellow 
participants may feel inclined to issue an announcement to the contrary. 
Whether they are well-advised to issue an announcement to the contrary, 
however, requires careful consideration of the evidence available to the 
defector. Traditional enforcement punishes wrongdoers covering up their 
misdeeds more severely than wrongdoers admitting and correcting their 
crimes. Furthermore, certain sanctions such as forfeiture of shareholder 
                                                 
120
 The empirical data cited supra n. 16 carry all of these arguments. 
121
 These requirements exist in France and Germany upon passing a certain threshold. 
See s. 27a of the German Securities Trading Law (‘Wertpapierhandelsgesetz’); the U.S. 
disclosure rules differ between disclosure by passive shareholders (Schedule 13g-filing) 
and disclosure by active shareholders intending to influence the issuer, or its 
management (Schedule 13D- filing). The later are mandated to disclose their intentions, 
see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” 
Property Rights in Information, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1250, 1275 (2001). 
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rights depend on the fact that violations of disclosure rules have not been 
corrected. If evidence is strong (which is a precondition for the 
enforcement of the Premium Claim, see infra), the participants are well 
advised to give in rather than resist.  
II. Determining the Announcement Premium 
The size of the reward depends on the calculation of the Announcement 
Premium. On the one hand, the longer the period of time included in that 
calculation, the greater the risk that other factors that influence the 
information value (such as defensive measures by management, counter-
disclosure by other participants, macro- or micro-economic issues relating 
to the issuer) impact on the size of the Premium Claim. This uncertainty 
reduces the defector’s risk adjusted return. On the other hand, a period 
that is too short may not reflect the value of the disclosed information to 
the market, but noise trading at the announcement date. In the [t+2] 
window122 a sound evaluation of the facts and responsive trading is 
feasible. While there may be exceptions, I deem a window of [t+/-2] 
appropriate. 
III. Enforcing the Premium Claim 
The reward model aims at an equilibrium that does not need the 
enforcement of the Premium Claim since all participants opt in favor of 
disclosure if the joint holding surpasses disclosure thresholds. However, in 
the real world, transaction costs from enforcing the Premium Claim may 
hamper the incentivizing effect of the Premium Claim. If the individual 
benefits from remaining silent exceed the sum of additional benefits from 
(early) disclosure minus legal costs for enforcing the Premium Claim, 
disclosure is unlikely to happen (see Fig 4 supra). The premium claim 
must be automatic in its legal qualification,123 enforced strictly, easily and 
inexpensively, while avoiding unnecessary involvement of parties with 
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 Some empirical studies rely on the t+2 window, supra n. 16. 
123
 Any fuzziness will be reflected in the potential defector’s risk calculus. Let β|0<β<1 
denote the risk from legal uncertainty. Under a reward model in a fuzzy legal environment 
(i.e. unclear wording etc.), disclosure will happen if β x PC < α x P (A;B), i.e. defectors will 
balance the risk of being deprived of the Premium Claim due to legal peculiarities against 
the profits from remaining silent.  
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their own agenda. At the same time, in order to avoid exploitation of the 
reward scheme, a critical review of the facts is a precondition for granting 
the Premium Claim to the entity claiming the existence of an unlawful 
acquisition scheme.  
This necessitates three legal requirements: 
1) If the facts presented to regulators by the defector provide for evidence 
as to the existence of an unlawful acquisition scheme regulators should be 
entitled to impose a lien on a fraction of the participants’ shares in order to 
secure payment of the Premium Claim.124 
2) If there are more than two participants, in order to improve evidence, a 
fraction of the Premium Claim (for instance, 10-20%) may be assigned to 
the second defector, an even lower fraction to the third defector, and so 
on, under the condition that there remain some participants to be 
punished, in order to retain some deterrence effect. Alternatively, the 
second defector may enjoy lesser administrative or criminal penalties.125  
3) In a preliminary proceeding, a specialized court, with the regulator 
acting as claimant on behalf of the first and the second discloser,126 
establishes whether the defector is entitled to the Premium Claim and 
which size is appropriate. This depends on whether the defector practiced 
an open, complete, candid and continued cooperation with authorities that 
substantially improved the authorities’ knowledge about the committed 
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 In order to work this lien needs to rank above claims from investor suits. The thorny 
political issues associated with the implementation may best be explained by 
understanding the Premium Claim as valuable service to the market and thus investors; 
without defection investor suits would be all but impossible. 
125
 For a parallel in antitrust law, see S.D. Hammond, Measuring the Value of Second-In 
Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations, online 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech_hammond.htm (last visited 
Novembner 2009): Under US law, discount re penalties of 30%-35% for the second; the 
European Commission “will determine in any final decision adopted at the end of the 
administrative procedure the level of reduction an undertaking will benefit from, relative to 
the fine which would otherwise be imposed. For the: - first undertaking to provide 
significant added value: a reduction of 30-50 %, - second undertaking to provide 
significant added value: a reduction of 20-30 %, - subsequent undertakings that provide 
significant added value: a reduction of up to 20 %.” See EU Leniency Notice, supra n. 60, 
¶26; Wils (2007), supra n. 60, at 10. For a strict ‘winner takes all’ approach Spagnolo 
(2007), supra n. 59, at 15 et seq.; Spagnolo (2004), supra n. 71; Spagnolo (2000), supra 
n. 71, sub 4.1.  
126
 Public prosecutors fulfill a similar function in traditional criminal proceedings. 
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violation.127 Only if hard facts are provided, the evidence withstands court 
scrutiny sufficiently in order to punish the fellow wrongdoers. The later is 
necessary to deter future violations (commonly referred to as 
desistance).128 
If the Premium Claim is the defector’s prey, we can reasonably expect that 
the facts can be established with certainty: virtually all communication will 
be available on tape, time, date and other details of agreements are 
somewhere safely stored and registered, widely-spread amnesia of the 
participants will vanish. However, in the absence of early confessions 
(which may be more likely in light of good evidence) the Premium 
Claimdoes not change the fact that judges and juries must evaluate, and 
exercise judgment based on, these facts. 
IV. Exploiting the System & Constitutional Concerns129 
The downsides of a reward scheme do not go unnoticed.  
1. Reduced deterrence by lower fines? 
A reward scheme could encourage secret acquisition schemes since it 
generates a drastic reduction in the expected fines. In our model, any 
participant A and B as perennial player is likely to balance the profits made 
from defection against fines in cases where it were too slow to defect. If 
the reward of Scheme 1 was too high, it set off penalties in Scheme 2, and 
so on. Such a reward scheme would create incentives to engage in hidden 
acquisition schemes rather than preventing it. Giancarlo Spagnolo has 
shown that complete deterrence without public investigation may be 
achieved if the fines are sufficiently but finitely large, and if the 
whistleblower’s reward is lower than the sum of fines paid by the other 
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 While the former qualitative requirements are the joint requirements of the US DOJ 
and the European Commission for antitrust leniency, only the European Commission 
requires a substantial improvement in knowledge. 
128 See J. Harrington, Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs, manuscript, John Hopkins 
University (7/2005), online http://www.econ.jhu.edu/pdf/papers/WP527harrington.pdf (last 
visited November 2009).  
129
 Please note that similar arguments are used in the discussions surrounding Whistle 
Blowing in securities law, Crown Witnesses in the criminal justice system, and Leniency 
Programs in antitrust law. 
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wrongdoers.130 My reward model (Table 2) meets this condition: the 
reward PC is always lower than the fines paid by the non-defectors 
because the sum of fines (in Spagnolo’s meaning) consists of PC + F(A;B), 
with F being any administrative penalties, damages to investors, etc. 
added to the Premium Claim (PC) that is paid to the defector. 
2. Benefits from Violating the Law? 
If, from the individual’s perspective, violating the law may turn out to be 
beneficial, honest citizens are punished for their honesty. This moral 
concern disregards two important aspects. First, disclosing major 
shareholdings serves a purpose which is providing the market with 
information on firm undervaluation that it would otherwise miss. The 
defector is reimbursed for its information service. The Premium Claim 
does not only grant benefits for wrongful deeds, but also reimburses the 
defector for its reputational loss in the ‘criminal community’ due to 
disclosure. One may argue that honest citizens would not discount the 
defector’s reputation for its information production; instead, they may 
assign rewards to the defector. However, the rewards to be received by 
the honest (such as reputation, future business, etc.) lie in the future and 
are discounted for that very reasons (see above), while the defector’s loss 
is imminent. Facing the alternative of rules without efficient enforcement, 
where all wrongdoers get away, and of rules with efficient enforcement, 
where one wrongdoer gets free and the others are caught, the latter 
alternative is the preferable. 
Secondly, if the model functions according to plan, the likelihood that the 
Announcement Claim is ever paid and wrongdoers profit from their deeds 
is Zero: Up to a certain threshold where the transaction costs exceed the 
expected future profit from disclosure, the model does not incentivize 
disclosure (i.e. if the joint threshold slightly exceeds the disclosure 
threshold). Beyond this level we expect the model to result in an 
equilibrium under which no participant infringes the law.  
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 Spagnolo, (2000), supra n. 71, sub 3.2 and 3.3; Spagnolo, Divide et Impera, (2004), 
supra n. 71; Spagnolo (2007), supra n. 59, at 23 et seq.; Spagnolo’s results were 
experimentally confirmed by Bigoni et al (supra n. 60), at 21. 
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In experiments with reward schemes that meet the Spagnolo conditions 
(see above) the players still cooperated, albeit on a very low level.131 
While the deterrence level of a reward policy was four times as high as 
traditional enforcement and 2.5 times as high as leniency, the good news 
is that the reward induced at least one participant to defect in almost all 
cases. If the real world functions like this experimental design, entities 
nevertheless entering into cooperation are those with the hope of fooling 
fellow wrongdoers, rather than the market. Transferring this result to the 
domain of securities law achieves a striking insight: Under a reward policy 
cooperation is likely to harm fellow participants only. All other entities are 
provided with the means to recuperate their losses: Administrative fines 
against non-defectors may reimburse enforcement agencies for their 
(reduced) efforts, and litigation does the same for harmed investors. While 
this is not the optimal state of law enforcement - the first best state is 
complete deterrence with no enforcement costs -,132 it comes very close to 
the very best state as it achieves very high deterrence with low net 
enforcement costs (after recuperation). Moreover, the experiment showed 
that the reward policy strongly deters cooperation, the more the longer 
subjects play.133 While the hope that the lessons by costly Premium 
Claims will eventually erase all misdeeds is too optimistic, rather than 
punishing honest citizens for their honesty, a reward policy is likely to 
reduce secret acquisition schemes to the lowest level possible. Only 
entities that are oblivious to deterrence (irrational actors, fools etc.) and 
those which in light of their bounded rationality (supra D.I.) underestimate 
the risk of defection134 remain to conspire. 
For these entities oblivious to deterrence, traditional public enforcement 
may supplement the reward model. In the state where the reward model is 
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 In the experiment by Bigoni et al (supra n. 60), at 13, 23, traditional ex post 
enforcement resulted in cooperation in 31.5% of the cases. While under a leniency 
scheme (as is currently the law in antitrust) cooperation dropped to 17.8%, under a 
reward scheme the participants entered into cooperation in only 7.8% (i.e. only a quarter 
of the cases as under traditional enforcement).  
132
 See Becker (note 4). 
133
 Bigoni et al (supra n. 60), at 23 report that in rematches cooperation dropped 
systemically, to a level that was equal to 1/3 of the initial level.  
134
 This might be, for example, due to personal and family relationships. 
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applied, public enforcement may become a (more) viable as compared to 
the present state, since as a result of deterrence by the reward model, 
regulators have few cases to each which they may devote significant 
resources.  
3. Benefits for the Originator? 
The model presented herein may result in the main activist, organizer or 
ringleader, i.e. the worst wrongdoer, benefitting from the Premium Claim 
and from the minor wrongdoings of the remaining participants. On the one 
hand, granting benefits to the worst wrongdoer may increase deterrence 
by ensuring that the ringleader cannot be completely trusted, as the 
ringleader may also lose confidence in the fellow participants’ loyalty and 
disclose the scheme.135 Moreover, the organizer’s exclusion weakens the 
likelihood of detection and punishment, since the scheme organizer avails 
itself to the best information, and its exclusion incentivizes fellows to 
cooperate more closely with the organizer, as it provides a safe harbor.136 
On the other hand, the ringleader could coerce discipline over, or use the 
Premium Claim as an artifice to negotiate more favorable terms from other 
participants, as it has the best evidence at hand and may rush to disclose 
at the moment when it considers it objectives achieved. More importantly, 
granting benefits to the worst wrongdoer for violating the law raises 
constitutional concerns, and is questionable in terms of morality.137 In 
addition, it may provide perverse incentives, by inducing the set-up of the 
scheme in order to profit from the Premium Claim, rather than from an 
overall increase of the stock price due to superior information production. 
In some jurisdictions, these paramount considerations account for 
exclusions of cartel organizers from, or reductions of, antitrust leniency.138 
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 See Leslie, Cartel Stability (2006), supra n. 58, at 477 (re price fixing); Spagnolo 
(2007), supra n. 59, at 14. 
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 Bigoni et al., supra n. 60, at 20 show that excluding the ringleaders goes along with 
reduced incentives to disclose. 
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 Wils (2007), supra n. 60, at 31. 
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 The US Department of Justice excludes the leader in, the originator of, or those who 
have pressured others to join the cartel, Corporate Leniency Policy (supra n. 60), sub A. 
6. and Art. 28* of the Sentencing Guidelines (supra n. 60). Under the European 
Commission’s leniency policy “[a]n undertaking which took steps to coerce other 
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In light of this consideration, the law may exclude the originator from the 
Premium Claim.  
Excluding the originator is unlikely to impact on the incentive-based power 
in case of the Service Strategy where originator and investment banks are 
unlikely to opt in favor of early disclosure anyway. (It is here where 
granting rewards to agents rather than principals is particularly valuable). 
In the case of the Equity Strategy, one may hope that each participant 
waits for someone else to take the lead; if all want to retain the reward 
option, no hidden acquisition will materialize. One may accept the losses 
with respect to detection associated with the exclusion of the ringleader in 
order to establish a high level of deterrence and maintain higher (i.e. 
ethical or constitutional) standards than efficiency. 
V. The Issue of Overenforcement 
Overenforcement may become an issue in three variants: A smoothing 
effect on takeover activity, erroneous prosecutions and convictions of 
innocent firms, and preventing firm activity at the border but within legality. 
1. Erroneous convictions? 
Erroneous convictions (so-called Type I-errors) of innocent firms or 
individuals provide the most serious threat to the acceptance of an 
enforcement system within society. However, within developed legal 
systems, false convictions are less likely than false acquittals.139 This is 
particularly true in the takeover context, where sophisticated investors with 
sufficient resources to defend their positions rigorously are the subject of 
regulatory scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                     
undertakings to join the cartel or to remain in it is not eligible for immunity from fines. It 
may still qualify for a reduction of fines if it fulfils the relevant requirements and meets all 
the conditions therefor.” See EU Leniency Notice, supra n. 60, ¶ 13, 22. In Germany, the 
Bundeskartellamt excludes from immunity the ringleader of the cartel, Notice no. 9/2006 
of the Bundeskartellamt on the immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel cases – 
Leniency Programme – of 7 March 2006, available at www.bundeskartellamt.de (sub 
Bonusregelung). See Spagnolo (2007), supra n. 59, at 14; Zingales, supra n. 58, at 34, 
45. 
139
 For antitrust, see Buccirossi & Spagnolo, Corporate Governance and Collusive 
Behavior, in Dale W. Collins (Ed.), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, 2007, Antitrust 
Section, American Bar Association, Chapter XX, sub 4. 
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As a particularity of the reward model, crown witnesses are in line to 
receive multi-million dollar paydays for their testimony. However, the 
situation is analogous to CEOs being held personally liable, or firms being 
sued with multiple damages. Courts will adjust. 
2. A Better world? 
As was shown herein, the reward model avoids disadvantages stemming 
from established enforcement methods of traditional voting rights 
disclosure rules. From an overall perspective, does it result in a better 
world? 
This is likely the case under two conditions. First, the reward model works 
best in an environment where disclosure thresholds are high, in relative 
terms: Very few (non-active) investors would go anywhere near the 
threshold if they have reason to fear that their stake is reported and the 
reward scheme is being triggered. The regulatory stigma would be too 
great. The fallout of potentially draconian enforcement induces non-
conspiring, honest investors to circumnavigate the thresholds, with some 
safety distance. In a low threshold environment, there is little leeway to do 
so. The mandatory 5%-threshold provided by U.S. and European law, and 
the additional 3%-threshold established in certain European jurisdictions 
(e.g. Germany) do not pose problems, in that regard.  
Secondly, the reward model is most beneficial in a low enforcement 
environment. Low enforcement does not refer to the quality or strictness 
of securities law or the respective regulators, but the overall transparency 
of activities from financial services firm. This is, generally speaking, true 
with respect to the environment in which participants arrange the hidden 
acquisition strategies analyzed in this article. It remains to be true even if 
CCP clearing is established for all standardized derivative contracts on a 
national level (for example, in the U.S. and Europe):140 The influence on 
someone else’s voting rights (other participant, investment bank) which is 
the undisclosed criteria of both the Equity and the Service Strategy is not 
put in writing and not part of trading data. In addition, trading transparency 
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is limited and remains to be limited to the respective domestic level, while 
said acquisitions are managed on an international scale.141 The reward is 
an inexpensive mechanism which may be implemented on the domestic 
level, but which impacts on cross-border activities to the same extent as 
domestic activities. 
If the reward model impacts on capital markets and takeover activity to the 
same extent as Economic Ownership Disclosure, the model does not 
exhibit advantages while it may come along with transaction and agency 
costs (litigation, perverse incentives etc.). Any type of disclosure rules 
smoothes takeover activity to some extent. The reward model results in 
disclosure only when investments are backed by de facto voting power. 
Economic Ownership Disclosure (as implemented in the UK and 
Switzerland) requires disclosure of any economic investment even though 
the investment does not come along with voting power. These two models 
differ with respect to the scope of the smoothing effect. While the reward 
model mitigates solely takeover activity, in addition to takeovers Economic 
Ownership Disclosure impacts on the price-setting function of the stock 
markets for corporate stock. Under Economic Ownership Disclosure, the 
activity of large-scale arbitragers is all but impossible. Again, this 
argument does only hold water in a low-threshold environment.  
3. Borderline activity? 
A reward model may indeed smooth firms’ activity at the border but within 
legality. Please note, however, that the alternative of infringing the law is 
not doing nothing, but acting according to the law. Facing the decision of 
disclosure and no disclosure, the reward model induces firms to apply a 
pro-disclosure attitude, when planning takeovers. Generally speaking, this 
result is desirable. If firms need extensive legal resources to craft devious 
schemes around the law, the scheme is likely to infringe, if not the letter, 
then at least the spirit of the law. It is an advantage of the reward model 
(as compared to Economic Ownership Disclosure) that the borderline is 
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clearly set. Economic-only investments through derivatives and indirect 
holdings remain in the safe harbor.  
F. Other Types of Inside Information? 
Albeit not in a technical sense, the knowledge of undisclosed major 
shareholdings constitutes inside information. This raises the question of 
whether the model could be equally useful in enforcing other types of 
mandatory disclosure. I do not think so.  
Two aspects142 render extending the scope of the reward model doubtful. 
First, the Premium Claim would inevitably be paid by the shareholder 
constituency. The issuer’s management is most likely to violate disclosure 
rules. While one could consider civil liability claims against management, 
civil liability is often insured by the company (i.e. at the costs of the 
shareholders), or excluded in the corporate charter. Moreover, if one 
manager defects by early disclosure, the company and its shareholders 
are likely to suffer from the stress put on the managerial team. Secondly, 
while there are few viable excuses for violating major shareholding rules, 
there may be good business reasons (some of which the law accepts) for 
maintaining secrecy. The reward model is apt for clear cut rules, but 
creates more harm than good in a fuzzy legal environment. 
G. Conclusion 
According to Garret Hardin143, when looking for a technical solution, 
rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious 
assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that, if the proposed 
reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all. As 
passivity is also a form of action, doing nothing is impossible. Instead, 
mankind is asked to use rationality in order to compare the present state 
of the world with the state that is likely if the reform is adopted.  
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 The limited scope of the reward model is not due to the fact that disclosure of ordinary 
inside information may prompt a negative rather than a positive stock price response. 
While a positive stock price reaction is the model assumption, disclosure of major 
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This article has shown that the status quo of shareholder transparency 
rules is, in fact, not perfect. As the case for “action” was established, it 
presented an incentive-based enforcement model for a high-threshold 
environment. Granting the premium to the first individual or entity that 
discloses a secret acquisition results in an equilibrium in which the secret 
acquisition of major shareholdings without disclosure is unlikely to happen. 
As discoverable advantage, the reward model avoids the negative impact 
on the pricing function of capital markets as well as the anti-governance / 
pro-management effects that come along with Economic Ownership 
Disclosure. While implementing the model faces some real world 
challenges, indeed, and some market participants may be unable to learn 
or do not believe in the likelihood of getting caught, rational decision-
making precludes “the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems 
are tolerable.”144 The reward model is a step in the right direction. 
Securities Regulators are encouraged to adopt this powerful tool which 
has been successfully implemented in other fields of law for efficiently 
enforcement of shareholder transparency rules.  
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